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II. Criminal Law and Procedure
A. Border Searches of Body Cavities-Huguez v. United States,
406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Morales v. United
States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969).
A major problem confronting law enforcement officers in the
United States is the growing use of drugs and the mounting wave of
crime incident to their use. The vast majority of drugs are smuggled
into this country from Mexico.' Operation Intercept, the federal government's program for more thorough searches at the Mexican border,
has heightened public awareness of the problem and illustrates the extent to which the authorities will go to halt the drug influx. Operation
Intercept, however, is aimed primarily at reducing the smuggling of
marijuana. The illegal importation of hard drugs like heroin poses a
much graver problem in terms of both the dangers incident to their use
and the difficulty in controlling them.
Since the difficulty in controlling drug use increases greatly once
drugs have entered and been dispersed throughout the country, the
logical place to stop the drug flow is at the border. Among the methods
employed by customs officials to block this flow is the search of body
cavities, which are frequently used by smugglers to conceal their illegal
cargoes. Such searches, however, frequently conflict with the right of
the citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 The
resolution of this conflict is of utmost importance to the federal government's drug control problem.
The first session of Congress in 1789 passed legislation authorizing the search for and seizure of contraband aboard vessels or in buildings where the customs agents had "reason to suspect" it was concealed,3
but set no clear standard for determining the point at which the search
was to be made or the manner in which it was to be conducted. Modem
statutes continue to employ language authorizing the official to search
1. Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 376 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967);
Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
914 (1958).
2. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized" (emphasis added).
3. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
[9231
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and seize goods when "he . . . shall suspect there is merchandise" that
is either subject to a duty or illegally imported.4
Since 1789, the courts have uniformily considered border searches
to be different from normal police searches because of the need to protect our national security 5-a need that requires control over the influx
of persons and property into the United States. Nevertheless, the courts
have held that border searches, like normal searches, must meet the
fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness, 6 although there is no
need for either probable cause, 7 a search warrant, or an arrest, before
conducting a search.' "[The mere fact that a person is crossing the
border is sufficient cause for a search." 9 Furthermore, within certain
limits set by decided cases, searches requiring invasion of the body have
been sanctioned by the courts. The protective umbrella of the fourth
amendment guards the individual only against unreasonable searches and
unjustified intrusions, and not against all such invasions of the body.' 0
The problem, therefore lies in the extent to which the courts consider
the acts of the customs inspectors to be reasonable.
The thesis of this Note is that the time has come for the courts to
measure the reasonableness of border searches of body cavities by the
already well-defined yardstick of probable cause, which has traditionally
been used to determine the constitutionality of normal searches. The
courts have in recent years relied on the less stringent test of "clear
indication" in deciding whether the search of the defendant's body was
warranted. An individual's constitutionally protected right of privacy
and his right to remain free from the gross humiliation of a search of
intimate body cavities, however, are far too important to be left to what
will be seen is the nebulous and ill-defined standard of "clear indica4. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
5. E.g., Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967);
Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1962).
6. Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965); Lane v. United
States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964).
7. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
950 (1961); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 977 (1961).
8. Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1962), quoting Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
665 (1936).
9. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) (court's
emphasis). It must be noted that border searches differ significantly among themselves. While the crossing, in and of itself, justifies a search of vehicles and baggage,
it surely cannot justify a search of body cavities. The emphasis of "a" indicates that
the court had this distinction in mind. Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 377
(9th Cir. 1968).
10. See, e.g., Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
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tion." Any test less exacting than probable cause is "fraught with almost certain abuse."'"
Clear Indication-Its Development and Application
The test of clear indication came into being in Schmerber v. California12 and was first applied to border searches in Rivas v. United
States.'3 In Schmerber, the defendant was convicted of driving while
under the influence of liquor. While he was being treated at a hospital,
a blood sample was taken, over his protests, by a physician at the request
of a police officer. The Supreme Court, upholding the conviction, declared:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any. . . intrusions on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a
clear indicationthat in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search. 14
In Rivas v. United States, the Ninth Circuit for the first time applied
this test in determining whether the customs officers had a sufficient
basis for suspicion to warrant a search of a body cavity. The court
stated:
[A] search involving an intrusion beyond the body's surface . . .
cannot rest on the mere chance that desired evidence may be
obtained. . . . There must exist facts creating a clear indication,
or plain suggestion, of the smuggling.' 5
The application of the test developed by these two cases was extended
by the Ninth Circuit in Henderson v. United States"6 to visual inspections of a body cavity. There, the court was appalled at the invasion
of privacy and reversed the conviction, observing:
[If] there is to be a requirement that she manually open her
vagina for visual inspection to see if she has something concealed
there, we think that we should require more than a mere suspicion. . . . Surely. . . to be warranted, the official's action should
at least by [a] "clear indication" [or] "plain suggestion"
be backed
17
The Ninth Circuit Court had the opportunity in two recent cases
to reject the clear indication standard and adopt the test of probable
cause, but unfortunately failed to do so. 8 In Morales v. United
11. Id. at 754-55 (dissenting opinion).
12. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
13. 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
14. 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (emphasis added).
15. 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966).
16. 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
17. id. at 808.
18. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969); Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
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States,19 where the court encountered a situation similar to Henderson,
the defendant was convicted of importing cocaine and heroin into the
United States in violation of sections 173 and 174 of Title 21 of the
United States Code. Morales was stopped at the California-Mexico
border solely on the information that her car was seen parked in the
driveway of a cohort of a known narcotics dealer. A preliminary search
was conducted and defendant was made to disrobe and expose her
vaginal area. This visual inspection revealed "something 'sort of like a
bubble'" protruding from her vagina.2 0 Defendant was then taken
to a physician whose examination revealed no indication that she was
either a user or under the influence of narcotics. A vaginal search,
however, produced one packet of cocaine and three of heroin. The
Ninth Circuit, in overturning the conviction, held that the vaginal probe
by the doctor could not be justified by the discovery of the "bubble"
because there was no clear indication that the defendant had drugs secreted there prior to the visual inspection. 2 ' The court declared that
while the facts might lead one to suspect that the defendant was carrying narcotics, there was no clear indication of it. The court termed
the treatment suffered by the defendant a "serious invasion of personal
privacy and dignity."2 2
In Huguez v. United States,23 which involved a fact situation similar to Rivas, a different panel of judges 24 held that the appellant, who
had also been convicted of violating section 174 of Title 21 of the
United States Code, was illegally searched. Huguez was stopped at
the San Ysidro border crossing by a customs inspector who became
suspicious that the defendant was under the influence of drugs. A
thorough strip search revealed needle marks on defendant's arms. 25 He
was then taken to another room in the baggage area where he was
examined by a physician. The doctor concluded he was under the influence of narcotics and requested permission to conduct a digital probe
of the rectum to ascertain whether any drugs were secreted there.
Huguez refused and was forced to lean over an examining table against
19. 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969). The panel consisted of Circuit Judges
Merrill and Duniway, and District Judge Crary.
20. Id. at 1299.
21.

Id. at 1300.

22.

Id., quoting Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).

23.
24.

406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Barnes and Ely, and District Judge

Hauk.
25.

The customs inspector who made the first inspection testified that he also

found a "greasy substance" on Huguez's buttocks. However, it was not noticed by the
physician who later examined the defendant, nor did the first agent pass this information on to the doctor. Thus, there was even less reason for the physician to make a
rectal probe. 406 F.2d at 372.
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his verbal and physical protests. He suffered some minor cuts to his
wrists because of his treatment.2 6 The Ninth Circuit, reversing the
conviction, stated that the doctor and the agents involved in the rectal
search "did not and could not have even [a] 'mere suspicion' . . . let
alone any 'clear indication' or 'plain suggestion' of any cache of nar,,17
cotics in Huguez's rectum ....
Thus the courts have plainly indicated that the authorization by
the First Congress of a search based on suspicion alone is insufficient

to protect the individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The language of the Huguez and Morales decisions,
based on the holdings of Schmerber and Rivas, fully illustrates this.
When body cavities are to be invaded the Constitution demands more

than a "reason to suspect." Unfortunately, instead of applying the welldefined standard of probable cause, the courts have required the pre-

sumably less restrictive and infinitely more nebulous standard of "clear
indication."2 8

Clear Indication-What Is It?
The phrase "clear indication" is a rather elusive term. The Ninth
Circuit in Rivas v. United States 9 attempted, unsuccessfully, to give
some substance to the standard and defined it thusly: " 'Indication'
is defined as 'an indicating suggestion.' 'Clear' is defined as 'free from
doubt'; 'free from limitation'; 'plain.' " The court's definition is obvi-

ously not very helpful.

Semantically there seems to be an inherent

contradiction in the term. "Clear" implies certain as in "rear' or
"free from doubt." "Indication," on the other hand, implies an uncertainty as in "suspicion" or "suggestion." The court in Henderson, how-

ever, specifically states that a "real suspicion" is not sufficient for a
26. There is a very marked dispute between the majority opinion and the dissent
over the harshness of the treatment and the seriousness of the injuries to Huguez.
The majority states that the treatment was grossly unwarranted, while the dissent
vigorously denounces such an interpretation of the facts. 406 F.2d at 372-73, 386-87.
27. Id. at 378.
28. It should be noted that in Huguez a motion for an en banc hearing was
denied with four dissenting votes. The petition for rehearing stated two reasons for
the motion. First, that the standard of "clear indication" as set forth in Rivas v.
United States, was subsequent to the decision in the District Court. Thus it was
assumed by the prosecution that only enough evidence to show "mere suspicion"
was necessary, and that additional evidence to meet the "clear indication" standard
was not introduced. "Change in legal standards should not prevent a retrial where
the evidence may show that the stricter standard was satisified." Petition for Rehearing at 2, Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968). Second, that the
decision was inconsistent with Rivas. Id. at 3. See Thompson v. United States, 411
F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1969), where Judge Ely, in his dissent, seems to imply that the
majority of the 10 judges felt that a "clear indication" was not present.
29. 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
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visual examination of a vagina or an intrusion into the body cavity."0
This difficulty indicates the uselessness of the standard and offers a
persuasive rationale for its abandonment.
The lack of guidelines leaves the test of clear indication open to
abuse, even by well-intentioned customs agents. With the courts playing games with semantics, substituting one phrase for another, the bewildered border official can hardly be expected to understand what the
standard is and know when to apply it.
Judge Ely, in his concurring opinion in Huguez and his dissenting
opinion in Thompson v. United States,3 offers another sound rationale
for the rejection of the clear indication test. He points out the lack of
substance in the standard and states that the application of it is so inconsistent on the part of the judges, that a change of just one member
of the three man panel often changes the result. This causes uncertainty and inequity in the law.32
Counsel for appellant in Huguez argued in his opening brief that
clear indication means a sufficient amount of evidence to create a high
probability that there is something concealed in the body cavity to be
searched,33 and therefore that probable cause is a less stringent test
than clear indication.3 4 This is clearly erroneous. Probable cause has
been defined as a combination of "facts and circumstances . . . [which
are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution"
to believe that an offense has been committed.3 5 While a comparison
of these terms might lead one to conclude that it would take more evidence to reach a clear indication than probable cause, this is definitely
not the way the courts have interpreted it. In Rivas, the Ninth Circuit
specifically stated that clear indication is a less demanding standard
than probable cause.3 6 The above disagreement lends additional credence to the claim that the court's failure to adequately define clear
indication has produced confusion among those called upon to make
practical application of the concept.
While drawing the line between the standards of clear indication
probable
cause is difficult at best, the author feels that the following
and
hypotheticals might illustrate the distinction sought to be made by the
courts.
30.
31.
32.

Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
Thompson v. United States, 411 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id.; Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 383 (9th Cir. 1968) (concurring

opinion).
33. Brief for Appellant at 4, 12, Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th
Cir. 1968).
34. Id. at 35.
35. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
36. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967).
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(A) Suppose X is crossing the border and is acting in a suspicious manner. An examination reveals needle marks on his arms.
Because some suggestion of the presence of narcotics in the suspected
this should not be sufficient to create even a clear
cavity is necessary,
37
indication.
(B) Suppose the same facts as in (A) plus the fact that X is a
registered addict. While this could be considered enough to warrant a
body search on the basis of clear indication-since where a user is
crossing the border " 'it follows almost as night follows day that he is
carrying narcotics somewhere' ,,3 8 -it is not sufficient for probable
cause. "While it is no doubt true that a substantial number of body
cavity probes have unearthed narcotics, those facts by themselves do not
to believe that a given user is carrying narcotics
furnish probable cause
'39
in [a body cavity]"
(C) Suppose the same facts as in (B) and in addition a "greasy
substance" is found on X's buttocks. This would be sufficient to create
a probable cause and hence is more than sufficient for finding a clear
indication. The existence of such a substance gives rise to a great
degree of probability that something has been concealed in X's rectum.
Clear Indication-Is It a Satisfactory Standard?
With these hypotheticals in mind, it then becomes necessary to
consider whether clear indication serves as a satisfactory standard in
balancing the competing interests of society and the individual.
Those who are primarily concerned with the interests of society
maintain that the difficulty in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics
warrants the use of the less restrictive clear indication standard. These
advocates point to the harmful effects of narcotics as the basis for their
position. If the requirements for a search are too high and certain
areas of the body are made inaccessible, smugglers will use such odious
means almost exclusively. "There is nothing in the Bill of Rights which
makes body cavities a legally protected sanctuary for carrying narcotics."40
Government statistics, however, reveal that between December 19,
1963, and May 2, 1966, a period of more than two years, customs officials at the San Ysidro crossing between California and Mexico discov37.
38.
1968).
39.
40.
356 U.S.

Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1966).
Brief for Appellee at 6, Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.
Id.; Brief for Appellant at 43 (emphasis original).
Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
914 (1958).
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ered narcotics secreted in vaginas on only 17 occasions."
Testimony by Dr. Paul Salerno, the physician involved in Blefare, Rivas and
Morales, revealed that approximately 80 to 85 percent of body cavity
searches fail to result in any discovery of narcotics.4 2 As Judge Ely
points out in his strong dissent in Thompson v. United States,431 it can
be assumed that these unsuccessful searches were also done under the
reasoning of clear indication. The gross disparity between the number
so intimately searched the actual number of offences amply illustrates that the use of clear indication as a foundation for such intimate
searches is totally inadequate. Furthermore, no record exists of the
number of other innocent travelers who were subjected to such visual
inspections without being taken to a doctor for a search! 44 The implication is inescapable that as in Morales and Huguez where narcotics
were actually found, the vast majority of those unsuccessfully searched
were done so unconstitutionally.
The problems that customs officials encounter are undeniable.
Yet "[tihe existence of difficult problems of enforcement cannot override a constitutional prohibition against [an] unreasonable search [and
seizure]. 45 In this author's opinion, the test of probable cause is the
best method of resolving this problem. The probable cause standard
would offer better protection for the individual because its parameters
have been much more fully delineated by the courts, and thus is more
susceptible to consistent and equitable application on the part of border
officials. In addition, border officials plagued with the nearly impossible task of making a constitutionally practical application of the test
of clear indication, would find the firmer and more fully defined guidelines of probable cause easier to apply, and the searches performed
pursuant thereto less susceptible to constitutional objection.
The clear indication test has proved to be so nebulous and obscure
that an inordinate amount of abuses have been perpetrated upon a great
number of innocent travelers, all in the name of society's interest. As
Justice Douglas has so aptly argued:
If law enforcement were the chief value in our constitutional
scheme, then due process would shrivel and become of little value
in protecting the rights of the citizen. But those who fashioned
41. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). Huguez v.
United States, 406 F.2d 366, 376 (9th Cir. 1968), states that there were 20 such discoveries in body cavities at San Ysidro between July 1, 1965, and May 26, 1966.
42. Thompson v. United States, 411 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion), citing Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298, 1300 n.2 (9th Cir. 1969).
43. 411 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1969).
44. Id.
45. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967); accord, Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 376 (9th Cir.
1968).
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the Constitution put certain rights out of the reach of the police
46
and preferred other rights over law enforcement.
In the final analysis the resolution of the problem of body searches
at the border involves a balancing of two conflicting values-the need
of society to protect itself and the rights of the individual. Halting
illicit drug traffic is one of the major problems facing customs inspectors. The courts have frequently taken judicial notice of this and also
that the United States-Mexico border is the major corridor through
which narcotics enter this country. 47 The necessity of inspection in
order to enforce the customs laws has always been an infringement on
the individual's privacy. As long as the search is limited to an examination of baggage, vehicles and clothing, such an infringement, even on
the grounds of less than mere suspicion, must be tolerated. At this
stage the need for enforcement of customs laws outweighs the need for
protection of the individual from minor searches. Such searches are
normally anticipated by travelers, and hence do not result in any great
humiliation or invasion of privacy. When the search goes beyond this
cursory stage, however, the balance should tip in favor of the individual
and the test of probable cause should be applied.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized the utility of the probable
cause standard in balancing the opposing interests of law enforcement
48
and personal rights. Twenty years ago in Brinegar v. United States,
a case involving the illegal interstate transportation of liquor, the Court
stated:
The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly
hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave the
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice. 49
It is to be hoped that the courts will reappraise their position concerning the standards to be applied to body cavity searches. The need
to prevent the importation and use of drugs is important, but surely it
is outweighed by the constitutional rights of the individual. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It is the responsibility of the
courts to effectively protect the rights guaranteed by it and to prevent
the continuation of such indignities.
Gregory C. Paraskou*
46. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 376 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
48. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
49. Id. at 176.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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Foreign Officers and the Silver Platter Doctrine-Stonehil
v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).

With the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,' all evidence seized
by federal or state officers in violation of the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in
federal or state criminal trials. 2 Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit
in Stonehill v. United States3 emphatically reasserted an earlier holding"
that the Mapp exclusionary rule does not apply to seizures made by
foreign officers. 5
Harry Stonehill, an American entrepreneur living in the Philippines, was suspected by the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation
(N.B.I.) of activities not in harmony with the banking and revenue
laws of that country. N.B.I. agents obtained evidence from him by
searches and seizures which "flagrantly violated basic provisions of the
Philippine Constitution borrowed directly from the Fourth Amendment."' Evidence of United States tax irregularities was turned over
to an agent of the Internal Revenue Service attached to the American
Embassy in Manila. In an action for foreclosure of federal tax liens,7
the taxpayers moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the
searches and seizures were illegal because made in violation of the fourth
amendment and that United States agents participated in the illegal
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), first imposed the exclusionary
rule of evidence illegally seized by federal officers. Then in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), evidence illegally seized by state officers was excluded from
federal criminal trials. Finally, Mapp precluded the use in state courts of evidence
illegally seized.
3. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
4. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
(1967).
5. Another exception to the rule of Mapp concerns evidence wrongfully seized
by a private citizen. The leading case on this point is Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465 (1921). See generally Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Identity of the
Searcher-Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), 20 HASTINGs L.J. 990, 994-98 (1969); Note,
Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608
(1967).
6. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion).
7. The court in Stonehill expressly did not decide whether the exclusionary
rule should be applied to civil cases. 405 F.2d at 740 n.2. However, certain proceedings, though civil in form, are generally considered criminal in nature for purposes
of deciding whether constitutional protection should be imposed. See, e.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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searches and seizures.8 The court held the fourth amendment inapplicable to foreign officers9 and ruled that the evidence had been properly
admitted since United States agents had not participated in the searches
and seizures. 10
Under the silver platter doctrine, evidence which would have been
excluded if wrongfully seized by federal officers, was freely admissible
in federal courts if seized by state officers." Although the doctrine
was supposedly abolished in 1960,12 the admission of the evidence in
Stonehill plainly indicates that it is still applied when foreign officers
make the wrongful searches and seizures.
Stonehili's counsel urged that the evidence should have been excluded "even if seized by foreign officers in a foreign country, because
the searches and seizures were illegal by United States Constitutional
standards (in violation of the Fourth Amendment).' 8 The rationale
behind this direct attack on the silver platter, as applied by the Ninth
Circuit to foreigners, is that the constitutional rights of the defendant
are violated when the evidence wrongfully seized is used against him in
court, regardless of who performed the illegal search. It will be the
purpose of the first part of this Note to demonstrate that the foreign
officer silver platter doctrine, reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Stonehill, is contrary to the persuasive logic and reasoning which underlies
Mapp.
Mapp: Can It Be Extended?
A persuasive attack on the foreign officer silver platter doctrine
can be mounted by use of the reasoning of the Mapp opinion itself,
although our Constitution does not bind foreign officials and Mapp
does not mention the problem specifically. The fifth amendment prohibits the use of coerced confessions in criminal trials and this prohibition is extended to confessions coerced by foreign officials.' 4 The
fourth amendment excludes evidence obtained from illegal searches and
seizures by state or federal officers. 15 The Mapp decision, which ex8.
9.
10.
11.

405 F.2d at 740.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 746.
E.g., Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).

12. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1969).
13. 405 F.2d at 740. The Philippine Constitution contains guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure almost identical to those in our own fourth amendment. PHiLiPpm CoNsr. art. HI, § 1(3).
14. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (fifth amendment
controls involuntary confession issue). In Bram, confessions coerced by Canadian
officers were excluded without reference to the "foreign officer" problem. See Brulay
v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348-49 & n.5 (1967).
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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tended the federal exclusionary rule to state officials, referred 6 with
approval to the leading American case on unreasonable search and
seizure, Boyd v. United States,1 7 in which the Supreme Court stated that
the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other"' 8 and
that an "intimate relation" exists between them. 9 The Court was
"unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers
to be used as evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. ' 20 This idea, that the two
amendments are closely related complements, was expressed again in
Mapp: "The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is
complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its
sphere of influence ....
Given this concept that the fourth and fifth amendments are intimately related complements, one would assume that the exclusionary
rules arising out of the two amendments would be the same. Logically,
if the fourth and fifth amendments are to have equal constitutional
stature, if their judicial authority is to be the same, the rules of exclusion
that arise out of each should be coextensive and should be exercised
with equal vigor and thoroughness by the courts. If, in Stonehill, the
Ninth Circuit has failed to exclude evidence wrongfully seized by foreign officers, when a confession coerced by foreign officers would have
been excluded, the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment is not
being exercised coextensively with that of the fifth amendment.
The modem rule excluding coerced confessions is not based on the
23
reliability of the statement 22 but arises out of the fifth amendment.
Thus, its exercise in a criminal trial is not a rule of evidence but a constitutional right. A confession coerced by foreign officers would be
excluded although the fifth amendment is not binding on foreign offi24
cers.
16.
17.

Id. at 646.
116 U.S. 616 (1886).

Mapp also refers to a modern expression of the

Boyd idea of interrelation of the two amendments.

In Feldman v. United States, 322

U.S. 487 (1944), the Supreme Court was "immediately concerned with the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, intertwined as they are, and expressing as they do supple-

menting phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas
of personal privacy." Id. at 489-90.
18.

116 U.S. at 630.

19.
20.

Id. at 633.
Id.

21. 367 U.S. at 657.
22. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Whether or not a confession
is admissible is a "question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not

petitioner in fact spoke the truth." Id. at 544.
23. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (fifth amendment
controls involuntary confession issue).
24. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brulay v. United States,
383 F.2d 345, 348-49 & n.5 (1967).
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There are, however, two views on the exclusionary rule for illegally
seized evidence. By the earlier view, the rule was one of evidence,
designed by the courts to prevent violations of the Constitution by law
enforcement officers who should uphold it. 25 Under Mapp, however,
the rule is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments'' 20 and not merely a rule of evidence.27 According to the earlier
view, there is no reason to exclude evidence illegally seized by foreign
officers, because our courts have no duty to exercise supervisory control
over them. According to the Mapp view, however, which elevates
the rule to constitutional status, it seems logical to exclude evidence
wrongfully seized by anyone, even foreigners, just as a coerced confession would be excluded under the fifth amendment.
The Ninth Circuit has made a very basic differentiation between
the exclusionary rules arising out of the fourth and fifth amendments
when the activities of foreign officers are involved. 28 The court is able
to accomplish this differentiation by a dissection of the Mapp decision.
While Mapp specifically elevates the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule for domestic searches and seizures from the evidentiary to the constitutional level,29 the foreign search and seizure is not specifically
brought within the ambit of the holding. The underlying reasoning of
the Mapp decision would seem to call for the exclusion of evidence illegally seized by foreign, as well as domestic, officers, but the Ninth Circuit has taken advantage of the fact that the decision concerned only
domestic searches and has continued to view the rule as merely evidentiary in nature as applied to foreign officers. 30
In Brulay v. United States,"' the Ninth Circuit noted and attempted
to justify this differentiation. The court therein asserted that a violation
of the fifth amendment is not complete until the coerced confession is
admitted into evidence. At that point in time, and not during the
coercive interrogation, the defendant is forced to be a witness against
himself. By admitting the coerced confession, the trial court participates in the interrogating officer's violation of the Constitution. To
avoid this participation the court must exclude any such confession,
even though the coercion was by foreign officers.
On the other hand, the court stated, the fourth amendment is
25. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. 367 U.S. at 657.
27. See id. at 649.
28. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5.
29. See text accompanying notes 26-27.
30. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968); Brulay v.
United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
31. 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir. 1967). In this case the Mexican police
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violated completely by the officer's wrongful search and seizure. The
court is not participating in the constitutional violation by admitting
the evidence. The court excludes the evidence only because "it is inappropriate to sanction the previous violations of law by federal officers." 32 The court can, however, admit evidence illegally seized by
foreigners, since there is no duty to supervise their methods.
Thus, to justify a difference between the application of the fourth
and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules to foreign officers, the court
in Brulay was compelled to treat the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule as a rule of evidence, rejecting the analysis of Mapp. In Stonehill
also, the court rejected the Mapp view of the exclusionary rule and continued to consider it merely a rule of evidence not applicable to foreign
police; and the attack on the foreign officer silver platter doctrine, based
on the obvious unconstitutionality of the N.B.I. search, failed because
a3
the Ninth Circuit ignored Mapp.
The Participation Rule
The second ground for the motion to suppress the evidence was
that United States officers had participated in the search by Philippine
officers.34 Under the silver platter doctrine, which was developed in
cases involving federal and state officers 35 (and is applied here to the
analogous case involving federal and foreign officers)36 evidence seized
illegally by state officers could not be admitted into federal criminal
trials if federal officers had participated 3 1 in the wrongful state search
and seizure.3
The crux of the strong dissent in Stonehill, by Judge
Browning, was that the majority, in finding that the activities of an
I.R.S. agent in Manila did not constitute a judicially cognizable particiobtained evidence of an attempt to violate United States narcotics laws by means of a
search and seizure which violated United States constitutional principles. This evidence was turned over to American authorities.
32. Id. at 349 n.5.
33. 405 F.2d at 743. "Thus the Fourth Amendment could apply to raids by
foreign officials only if Federal agents so substantially participated in the raids as
to convert them into joint ventures between the United States and the foreign officials."
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 405 F.2d at 740.
35. E.g., Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927).
36. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968). Before
Elkins abolished the doctrine, it was applicable to Cuban officers. See Johnson v.
United States, 207 F.2d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1954).
37. Although the majority ultimately held that there was no participation, it
will be shown that the court admitted the fact of participation, but decided that there
was not enough to warrant exclusion. See text accompanying notes 67-76 intra.
38. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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pation in the search, had misapplied the silver platter doctrine. 9
The participation rule was first set down in Byars v. United
States.40 The Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to evidence wrongfully seized by a state and sought to be introduced in a
federal trial when facts indicated that "the federal government itself,
through its agents acting as such, participated in the wrongful search
and seizure." 1 The federal agent's participation must be "under color
of his federal office,"4 2 and the question of participation must be decided on the facts of each case.4 3
Gambino v. United States4 4 extended the rule enunciated in Byars
beyond actual participation by federal agents to cooperation of state
officers with federal law enforcement officers. In Gambino, New York
state troopers, after the repeal of the New York state prohibition act,
believed they were obliged to enforce the federal act. The Court held
that evidence illegally seized by them when they were acting "solely for
the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution ''4 5 had to be excluded
from a federal trial.
The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits extended the doctrine of
Gambino beyond situations in which state police were enforcing federal
law to cases in which federal and state officers had a prior "understanding" that federal prosecutors would adopt cases for prosecution after
seizure of evidence by state officers. 6
47
In 1949, on the day that the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado
held the fourth amendment binding on the states under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it also handed down the decision in
Lustig v. United States,4" which reaffirmed the silver platter doctrine
and more clearly explained the participation rule of Byars. Justice
Frankfurter, in Lustig, said that the "decisive factor in determining the
39. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion). "Assuming that the 'silver platter' doctrine governs this case, it is
misapplied by the majority." Id.
40. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
41. Id. at 33.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
45. Id. at 315.
46. Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942); Southerland v.
United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937); Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656
(7th Cir. 1932). The adoption of these cases for federal prosecution did not necessarily have to be automatic; it could depend on whether the case turned out to be
one of "sufficient importance." Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477, 479 (8th Cir.
1942). This rule is the broadest extension of Byars and seems to be the best one for
preventing circuitous violations of the Constitution.
47. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
48. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal
officer in the total enterprise. . . ."" The relatively minor role played
by the federal agent in Lustig (secret service agent called in by police
after the illegal entry only to point out what was necessary evidence of
counterfeiting to support a conviction) did not escape being considered participation since he was actually participating and he was participating as a federal officer." Any application of the Byars rule therefore, must be made in light of Lustig.
Federal participation is decided on the facts of each case. 51 It is
necessary therefore to examine the facts and language of the Stonehill
decision to determine if the Ninth Circuit has followed the standard set
out in the leading federal participation cases or has modified that standard to the extent that the evidence in Stonehill would be excluded under
the older rule but admitted under the newer rule.
Since the Philippine officers definitely suspected Stonehill of
crimes against the Philippines and hoped to deport him as an undesirable alien, 52 Gambino, in which state officers acted "solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution," is not in point. 3 The
federal agent in Stonehill had put an informer against Stonehill in contact with the N.B.I.A' Subsequent meetings between the N.B.I. and the
apprehensive informer, an American, were held in the revenue agent's
home. 5 At this point it would seem that the hosting of the meetings
is not necessarily participation because such acts would probably not be
considered acts "under color of his federal office."5 6
In addition to giving information, however, the federal agent in
Stonehill had requested and obtained, before the raids, permission to
examine and copy records seized, 57 in hope of securing evidence for a
federal tax case.58 It is important to note that the court, in finding that
all of the facts of the case did not constitute participation, relied on two
cases, Sloan v. United States5 9 and Shurman v. United States.6" In
Sloan, the giving of information by the federal officer, which inspired
the illegal state search, was described by the court as being "very close
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 79.
Id. at 78-79.
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1968).
See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
405 F.2d at 740-41.
Id. at 741.
See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
405 F.2d at 741.
Id. at 752-53 (dissenting opinion).
47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931).
219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955).
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to the line."
In Shurman, which reaffirmed Sloan, the giving of information, by itself, although it caused the illegal state search, was held
not to be a request by the federal agent for illegal state action, in the
absence of an understanding. 2 In neither Sloan nor Shurman, however, was there a request for access to the evidence seized. In both
cases, the court's opinion was that the giving of information to state
officers, by itself, was not proof that the federal agent was attempting
to circumvent the fourth amendment.6 3 In Stonehill, on the other
hand, the request for access to the evidence before the illegal search was
made strongly suggests that there was such an attempt. It is apparent,
therefore, that because of the officer's request for evidence, Sloan and
Shurman are not really in point as justification for his preraid activities.
In Byars v. United States,64 the Court stressed that the federal
agent participated "upon the chance. . . that something would be disclosed to him as such agent."6 5 In Stonehill, however, the Ninth Circuit
ignores this aspect of the Byars standard of federal participation. Even
by the majority version of the facts, the federal agent was hoping the
raids would disclose evidence for an American tax case against Stonehill."6 The request for access to the documents makes it clear that the
agent's actions fall under the Byars standard, at least to the extent of
his hopes for officially interesting disclosures.
In addition to the above damaging analogy to the Byars decision,
there were two instances during the massive 7 search when the federal
agent seems to have actually assisted, at least in a small way, the search
by the Philippine agents. First, he went to a warehouse, on request, and
pointed out the records "most significant from an accounting point of
view."6 8 At another location he pointed out the record storage area to
the N.B.I. agent in charge of searching a building. The agent had not
been aware of the location. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that this
action took only five minutes 9 and that in cases in which exclusion had
been warranted participation was "far more extensive." 70 Here the
court seems to have put a quantitative slant on the participation question.
61. 47 F.2d at 890.
62. 219 F.2d at 288.
63. See id. at 287; 47 F.2d at 890.
64. 273 U.S. 28 (1927); see text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
65. 273 U.S. at 32.
66. See 405 F.2d at 740-42.
67. id. at 747 n.4 (dissenting opinion). 'Two hundred agents of the Philippine
National Bureau of Investigation occupied 32 separate premises, rummaged through
private and business files for more than 12 hours, and trucked away thousands of
documents." Id.
68. 405 F.2d at 742.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 743.
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This quantitative standard appears more clearly in the Ninth Circuit's deceptive paraphrase of the Byars opinion. In Byars, the Supreme
Court used the phrase "joint operation" in a sense that was descriptive
of the search by federal and state officers in that particular case. 71 The
Court did not suggest that federal and state officers must play equal
parts in the search in order that there be sufficient federal participation
to merit exclusion. Stonehill does make such an implication under the
guise of paraphrasing Byars: "Thus, the Fourth Amendment could
apply to raids by foreign officials only if Federal agents so substantially
into joint ventures between
participated in the raids as to convert them
72
officials."1
foreign
the
and
States
the United
The question squarely presented now is whether the standard of
participation is one of degree or whether it is one of any actual participation as a federal officer at all. In Lustig v. United States, 73 the participation which called for the exclusion consisted of entering a room and
expertly assisting in the selection of evidence of counterfeiting from material which had already been gathered by the state officers. The agent
had not been in on the beginning of the illegal search. This fact situation seems clearly analogous to the selection by the agent in Stonehill
of documents "most significant from an accounting standpoint. ' 74 In
Lustig, however, the degree of the agent's share in the illegal search
was not the determining factor. The "actuality of a share by a federal
official in the total enterprise" was the determining factor. 75 That is
to say, the standard developed in Byars and Lustig calls for exclusion of
evidence upon a finding of any participation as a federal officer at all.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has adopted a new, quantitative
standard for deciding the federal participation question, which seems to
conflict with the language of the Supreme Court in Byars and Lustig.
This new standard is very clearly expressed in the Stonehill opinion:
"Whether the search does become a joint venture can be determined
only by a comparison of what the Federal agent did in the search and
76
seizure with the totality of the acts done in the search and seizure.1
That is to say, some participation in the search may not warrant exclusion, if the relative share in the search by the federal agent was minor.
Although the courts "have not been in complete agreement as to
just how closely federal officers have to be connected with the search
In this case, a federal
71. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
prohibition agent helped local officers find evidence of bootlegging under an invalid
warrant.
72. 405 F.2d at 743.
73. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
74. 405 F.2d at 742.
75. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
76. 405 F.2d at 744.
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and seizure before the Fourth Amendment is violated, '7 7 most circuits
seem to follow Lustig more closely than the Ninth Circuit does in
Stonehill.
The Tenth Circuit in 1959 stated that the agent must not participate "in any way" in the search. 78 Several circuits, including the Ninth
in an earlier case, have clearly implied that the presence of a federal
officer at a state search is synonymous with participation by him. 9
These views seem much closer to the "actuality of a share" standard of
Lustig than the view expressed in Stonehill.
In Anderson v. United States,80 explaining the participation question, the Ninth Circuit cited Lustig as the leading case and emphasized
the "actuality of a share" standard in quotation."' This earlier opinion
is ignored by the majority in Stonehill. Also in Anderson the Ninth
Circuit quoted with approval from Feldman v. United States, 2 in which
the Supreme Court said it "has refused to draw nice distinctions as to
when wrongful acquisition of evidence by state agencies was also a
federal enterprise."8 3 Stonehill condones blatant participation as long
as it falls within acceptable, quantitative limits-a rather nice distinction.
The Ninth Circuit has applied to the participation question of the
silver platter doctrine a novel, quantitative or comparative standard.
The new standard departs from the one promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Byars and Lustig. Moreover, it seems that this new standard
will make deciding the question more difficult for the trial courts. Predictability in these cases will decrease because of the increased subjectivity allowed by the Stonehill standard. One can foresee increased
judicial arbitrariness for the same reason. Because of the increase in
the exchange of witnesses and evidence by the United States and foreign
77. United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1956).
78. Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1959), vacated, 364
U.S. 282 (1960) (because "silver platter" doctrine abolished).
79. See United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 1954) (participated in, or were present at, the search); Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695, 696
(9th Cir. 1954) (no federal officers present nor was the search conducted at the instigation of any federal officer); United States v. Braggs, 189 F.2d 367, 369 (loth Cir.
1951) (searches not made in the presence of, nor with the participation of federal
officers); Gilbert v. United States, 163 F.2d 325, 327 (10th Cir. 1947) (acting in
presence of federal officers or in cooperation with them); United States v. Butler, 156
F.2d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1946) (or in the presence of federal officers); Miller v.
United States, 50 F.2d 505, 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 651 (1931) (in the
presence of a federal official).
80. 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
81. Id: at 122.
82. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
83. Id. at 492.
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countries in criminal matters in recent years 84 and the increased activities of United States law enforcement agents in foreign countries, 85 the
situation in Stonehill may recur with increasing frequency. It is suggested that the Ninth Circuit should return to the standard set out by
the Supreme Court in deciding this question. "[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed."8
There is no reason why the federal participation rule of
Byars and Lustig should be less strictly applied now against government
action overseas than it was during the silver platter days at home.
Paul T. Hanson*

C.

Custodial Interrogation-Lucas v. United States, 408 F.2d
835 (9th Cir. 1969); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391
(9th Cir. 1969); Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407
F.2d 535 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 858 (1969).

Few decisions in Supreme Court history have attracted as much
attention, both legal and political, as Miranda v. Arizona.' While the
controversy, and perhaps the reaction, 2 continues, courts throughout
America have been faced with the task of applying the decision's dictates. Although quite specific in Miranda about the substance of the
constitutional warnings an accused must be given,' the Supreme Court
was much less specific in setting forth the time when a suspect must be
so admonished:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en84. See Police: Global Beat, TIME, June 9, 1967, at 76.
85. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 429 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965).
86. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3501 (Supp. IV, 1969), making the absence of Miranda warnings one factor in determining the admissibility of confessions. At present, the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the law's constitutionality. The appointment of two new Justices by President
Nixon, however, may very well result in its being upheld.
3. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 4
To this last sentence the Court appended an "obfuscating" footnote:5
"This is what we meant in Escobedo6 when we spoke of an investigation
which had focused on an accused." 7
Subsequent decisions by state and federal courts that have attempted to interpret Miranda's "custodial interrogation" language are

by no means harmonious; they range from a judicial finding of custody
where a suspect was questioned near his car,' to holdings of noncustodial interrogation where the defendant was in a police station.'
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. See Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation"?-California'sAnticipatory
Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 59, 114 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Graham].
6. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Much commentary has centered on the issue
whether the Court by this footnote meant to supplement or replace Escobedo by
Miranda. It would seem that Miranda with its "custody" requirement has, indeed,
replaced the Escobedo focus holding. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966),
the Government's investigation clearly had centered on Hoffa when it sent an undercover agent to elicit incriminating facts from the Teamsters' boss. The Court rejected
Hoffa's Escobedo-Miranda contentions, speaking of Miranda's dictates as protection
against the inherent coercion of the in-custody setting and rejecting Hoffa's argument
that, in effect, since the investigation had focused on him he had a constitutional
right to be arrested and, therefore, conceivably, was entitled to his warnings. Id. at
310; see Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). In Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court was faced with a different situation. The petitioner was
in jail on a state charge when federal agents interrogated him as part of a routine tax
investigation. In part, the Government urged the Court to uphold the conviction on
the ground that the tax investigation had not focused in the sense that no criminal
charges were necessarily contemplated. Id. at 4. The Court rejected this in reversing
the conviction: "These differences are too minor and shadowy to justify a departure
from the well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to warnings to be given
to a person held in custody." Id. The Ninth Circuit panel in Lowe v. United States,
407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969), put it more bluntly: "The Court's decision in Miranda
clearly abandoned 'focus of investigation' as a test to determine when rights attach in
confession cases." Id. at 1396.
Or, as Professor Kamisar put it: "[T]he test is no longer (if it ever was) how
much information the police have when they approach a suspect, but how they
approach him, whether he is being subjected to inherent or implicit or indirect pressure
in a degree that requires the neutralizing, offsetting warnings." Kamisar, "Custodial
Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITurioN-SoURcES AND COMMENTARmS 335, 344 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar];
accord, United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968). See also N. SOBEL,
THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS 45 (1966); Graham, supranote 5.
8. People v. Ceccone, 260 Cal. App. 2d 886, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968); cf.
Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1968).
9. Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1969); Clark v. United
States, 400 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969); I-icks v.
United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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The recent Ninth Circuit cases of Chavez-Martinez v. United
States,'" Lowe v. United States," and Lucas v. United States,12 well-illustrate the courts' struggle to determine, in new contexts, the precise nature of the term "custodial interrogation" as it was so nebulously formulated in Miranda..3 This Note will examine these recent cases in an
attempt to expose possible inconsistencies and to determine the better

reasoned position.
Assuming that Escobedo, in effect, has been replaced by
Miranda,'4 an analysis of the rationale behind Miranda's custody requirement is necessary before a proper and expansive examination of
the Ninth Circuit's holdings can be made.
While Miranda and its companion cases' 5 dealt with station-house
questioning designed to elicit confessions, it is clear the Court intended
to extend the fifth amendment protections to custodial interrogations
outside the station house.' 6 Indeed, the Court made this plain in
Orozco v. Texas,17 where a homicide suspect was questioned by four
police officers while in his own bed. Another post-Miranda case,
Mathis v. United States,'8 held the fact of custody, not the reasons
10. 407 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 858 (1969).
11. 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969).
12. 408 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1969).
13. It has been suggested that the Court purposely omitted any concrete definition of the term in order to observe the actual scope of the problem. Graham, supra
note 5, at 63.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, California v. Stewart, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
16. See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 336.
As to the extent of permissible interrogation, there still exists a question of the
legality or constitutionality of an officer's stopping a person on the street to ask him
questions without probable cause to arrest. This problem is well beyond the scope
of this Note. However, the Supreme Court in the "stop and frisk" case of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), upheld the constitutionality of the stop and frisk procedure
involved in that case. However, the holding seems to have been a narrow one-involving the issue of a frisk for dangerous weapons. Id. at 15-16. The Ninth Circuit
analyzing Terry in Lowe v. United States said: "Even though the majority opinion
concerns the right of the officer to 'stop and frisk,' it is difficult to conceive how a
policeman is to avail himself of the protections outlined in Terry v. Ohio, unless he
is able to ask questions of the person he has stopped." 407 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th
Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), included
a few words on the subject: "[Wlhile the police have the right to request citizens to
answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer." Id. at 727 n.6. See La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 40 (1968). If the
process of questioning suspicious persons were declared, per se, unconstitutional, then,
evidently, any statements so made would be excluded on the basis of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
17. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
18. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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therefore, determinative of when the proper warnings must be given.
These holdings find their support in Miranda, where the Court
stated the basis for its custodial reasoning:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he could not otherwise do so freely. 19
It is the custodial situation, then, with its "inherently compelling" pressures and its "potentiality for compulsion, ' 20 which threatens the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. One writer
has put it rather succinctly:
[W]hen a suspect, who may reasonably conclude that his freedom
has been significantly restrained by a police officer, is questioned
presumed
about his guilt by the officer, it must be conclusively
21
that his "will to resist" has been substantially affected.
The Court in Miranda, however, did not limit itself to a narrow
definition of "custody." It adopted, instead, a more flexible approach,
perhaps in an effort to avoid the restrictive meaning inherent in "station-house restraint" and at the same time to forestall a controversy
over the definition of "custody." The Court broadened the potential
application of its holding by stating that custodial interrogation exists
not only when a suspect is actually present in the police station, but also
when he is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.""2
The Ninth Circuit, in Chavez-Martinez, Lowe, and Lucas, which
did not involve station-house interrogations, was placed in the unenviable
position of having to give content to this vague phrase and develop its
own standards for determining whether the appellants were deprived of
their freedom of action "in any significant way." In Chavez-Martinez,
the Ninth Circuit panel seemed uncertain where to draw that imaginary,
yet all important, line between permissible 23 and custodial interrogation.
19.

384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (emphasis added).

20. Id. at 457.
21. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 370 (author's emphasis). "[Clonsidering the evil
against which Miranda is directed, it is the fact of custodial interrogation rather than
its cause or the accusatory nature of the questions asked which necessitates the application of Miranda"' People v. McFall, 259 Cal. App. 2d 172, 176, 66 Cal. Rptr.
277, 279-80 (1968) (court's emphasis).
22. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
23. Regarding the extent of permissible interrogation, the Court in Miranda
made the following statement: "Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional
function of police officers in investigating crime. . .. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the
fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforce.
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In Lowe, however, the court in a painstaking analysis, attempted to
formulate definitive guidelines for determining what constituted custody.
Lowe v. United States
Arnold Lowe was convicted in the district court of interstate transOn appeal,
portation of a stolen vehicle in violation of the Dyer Act.
Lowe's sole basis for reversal was that statements which had been obtained from him unconstitutionally, were used against him at trial.
The challenged statements were made by Lowe to a deputy sheriff of
Yavapai County, Arizona, who had stopped the car which Lowe had
been driving in an erratic manner.2 5 The officer first asked Lowe to
present his driver's license and vehicle registration. Lowe produced
ment. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of incustody interrogation is not necessarily present. 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966). This
statement has also served as the basis for many holdings by the courts of appeals
that, in the cases before them, the situation was noncustodial. E.g., Freije v. United
States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1969) (police station questioning); Ping v. United
States, 407 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1969) (questioning in Internal Revenue office); Clark
v. United States, 400 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969)
(police station); McMillian v. United States, 399 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant's front porch); United States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1968)
(defendant's kitchen); United States v. Webb, 398 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1968) (defendant's office); Boyle v. United States, 395 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); White v.
United States, 395 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1968) (defendant's night club); Hicks v.
United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (police station); Arnold v. United
States, 382 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967) (defendant in bank); Williams v. United States, 381
F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967) (border questioning); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.
1966) (near defendant's car). Such seems also to have been the result in ChavezMartinez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1969), and Lowe v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1393-96 (9th Cir. 1969).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
25. An interesting question arises in such a situation. Generally, any arrest, by
its very nature, may be deemed a substantial deprivation of an individual's liberty.
However, what about so-called "traffic arrests"? While, generally, a traffic arrest involves only a citation, at least a momentary detention results. As stated by an Arizona
court: "[T]he requirement of a warning is a rule devised to offset any attempt by
authorities to get admissions or confessions by intimidation. However, traffic offenses
are not ones in which we find such risk of this kind of official behavior." State v.
Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 255, 431 P.2d 691, 695 (1967). "The degree of seriousness,
the number of offenses, the burden put upon police and courts, all militate against
extending the Miranda-Escobedo protections to certain types of traffic offenses." Id.
In Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966), the court held the initial
act of stopping the car was not an arrest. The same result is found in Lipton v.
United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965). Apparently, these cases hinge on a determination of the applicable state arrest statute. CAL. PEN. CODE § 834 defines arrest
as the "taking of a person into custody." Since a general traffic infraction does not
contemplate an actual taking into custody, but simply a citation, it does not fall within
the arrest definition. Where no applicable federal law exists, state statutes prevail.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
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neither, but did present his Social Security card for identification. The
deputy then asked him to identify the owner of the car. Lowe replied
that it belonged to a distributor in Ohio for whom he worked and for
whom he was selling merchandise that was in the car. In response to
the deputy's question about the employer's name, Lowe replied that he
could not remember. The deputy then asked him if he had permission
to drive the car. He replied in the affirmative. The deputy then asked
Lowe where he was going and whether he had any money. To this
question he answered that he was without funds and was going to California to look for work. No more questions were put to Lowe by the
officer. Soon thereafter, an Arizona Highway Patrolman arrived on the
scene and Lowe was subsequently jailed and questioned by an agent of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Lowe was not told that he was under arrest before or during any
of the above questioning, but the deputy was permitted to testify that
he intended to keep Lowe where he was, although this fact was never
denied Lowe's
communicated to Lowe. After a hearing, the trial court
26
motion to suppress the statements made to the deputy.
A Reasonable Man Formula
The Ninth Circuit, speaking through Circuit Judge Carter, affirmed
Lowe's conviction. First, the court recognized that the Supreme Court,
in Miranda, had abandoned "focus of investigation" as a test to determine when rights attach in self-incrimination cases.2' Carter adopted
as the correct test the reasonable man approach espoused by the California 2s and New York 29 courts and by Professor Yale Kamisar.3 0
26. The trial court did suppress the statements made to the F.B.I. agent. 407
F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir. 1969). While in traditional terms, appellants statements
to the Arizona deputy sheriff did not constitute confessions nor even admissions, the
Supreme Court in Miranda extended the privilege to include other statements: "No
distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege
against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate
himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for
precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements
and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact
truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact,
statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to
impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication." 384 U.S. 436, 476-77
(1966).
27. 407 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1969); see note 7 supra.
28. E.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1967).
29. E.g., People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d
225 (1967).
30. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 362.
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Basically, this approach can be stated as follows: "The belief of
the person [confronted by the authorities] as a 'reasonable man' that
his freedom is significantly impaired" determines whether the person
is in custody as interpreted by Miranda." The fifth amendment hypothesis upon which this conclusion is based, of course, is that once a
person reasonably believes that his freedom of action is significantly impaired, he will then feel the compulsion inherent in the situation. As a
result, the suspect's "capacity for rational judgement"3 2 is undermined
as he begins to feel compelled "to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely."3
The Miranda warnings, therefore, should be given
in order to allow the suspect the full benefit of his fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
While it is submitted that this test is the best yet advanced, the test
has certain weaknesses. One such weakness is that a suspect who still
believes he has an opportunity to talk himself out of arrest is perhaps
more likely to make false exculpatory statements than a suspect who
4
realizes he is under arrest.1
Undoubtedly, while such an objective reasonable man test would
be relatively easy for the courts to apply, it cannot be forgotten that such
a judicially created test serves the primary purpose of laying down
guidelines for the police. This objective test, however, does not always
assist the officer in knowing whether the suspect subjectively feels deprived of his freedom in a significant way and whether the suspect's
belief is reasonable.
Whether the suspect has a reasonable belief is to be judged by the
facts as they reasonably appear to him, which means that under
this [objective] test the officer would have to know what the
suspect thinks the officer
35 knows in order to determine when the
warnings must be given.
A Subjective Test
Another possible test advanced for determining custody, but one
explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Lowe, is what could be called
the subjective intent of the interrogator test.3 6 That is, if the confronting officer has formed an intent to arrest the suspect or to deprive him
of his freedom in any significant way, then, for all intents and purposes,
87
the thought is the fact.
31. Id.
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966).
33. Id. at 467.
34. Graham, supra note 5, at 86; La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 40, 105 (1968).
35. La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REV. 40, 105 (1968).

36.
37.

Kamisar, supra note 7, at 362.
See N. SOBEL, THE NEW CoNFESsIoN

STANDARDS 60

(1966).
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Important in this regard is Orozco v. Texas,88 decided a month
after Lowe, in which the Supreme Court, in reversing petitioner's homicide conviction, held the defendant's Miranda rights had been violated
when four police officers accosted and questioned him in his bed. The
Court relied, in part, on the following finding: "From the moment he
gave his name, according to the testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was not free to go where he pleased but was 'under arrest.' "9
This does not, however, seem to have been the primary basis for

the Court's holding, but only a point (albeit important) on which the
Court relied in order to come to its general conclusion that petitioner
was "deprived of his freedom of action." 40

The reasonable man test,

therefore, was not repudiated by the Court in Orozco; indeed, a reasonable man would think his freedom significantly impaired by the presence of a quartet of policemen surrounding his bed. In addition, the
situation presented in Orozco was certainly an example of the "policedominated atmosphere"4 1 emphasized by the Court in Miranda. Jus-

tice Harlan, concurring in Orozco "[plurely out of respect for stare
decisis," 42 appeared to recognize that Miranda was applicable to the

facts of Orozco.4"

38. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
39. Id. at 325.
40. Id. at 327.
41. 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). In the Lowe case, to the contrary, the interrogating officer was alone while appellant had a passenger. 407 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1969).
42. 394 U.S. 324, 327, 328 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. The dissent in Orozco seemed to miss the point: "The Court now extends
the same [Miranda] rules to all instances of in-custody questioning outside the station
house." 394 U.S. 324, 328, 329 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). It has been submitted that Miranda was never meant to be so limited. The dissent went on to say:
"Once arrest occurs, the application of Miranda is automatic. The rule is simple but
it ignores the purpose of Miranda to guard against what was thought to be the corrosive
influences of practices which station house interrogation makes feasible." Id. If the
dissent were correct in its assertion that "arrest" determines custody, then why did the
Court in either Miranda or Orozco not come out and say so? See Kamisar, supra
note 7, at 336.
If arrest were the test, courts would be faced with a determination of what
constitutes an arrest. There has been great confusion in this area and perhaps the
Court chose to avoid it. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), Seals
v. United States, 325 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d
328 (9th Cir. 1961); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1934). "'Arrest' is [confusing] . . . not only because it is necessarily unspecific and descriptive of complex,
often extended processes, but because in different contexts it describes different processes, each of which has built up, in both legal and common parlance, sharply divergent emotional connotations." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). Also, federal courts would have to apply state guidelines for
arrests made by state officers. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
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The Ninth Circuit in Lowe pointed out the obvious fallacy in a
subjective test that hinges on the intent of the officer:
Suppose X owes money to Y and Y determines to collect it. Y
decides that when he next confronts X he will demand his money
and if X refuses to pay, Y will collar him, take X forcibly to a
private place and forcibly take sufficient money to pay the debt;
in other words, make a false arrest to secure the money. Y stops
X on the street, demands his money and gets it. Although Y's
intent was to detain or "arrest" if necessary, certainly what trannot a detention or an "arrest." No court would
spired was
44
so hold.
In other words, although the officer may form a subjective intent to
deprive the suspect of his freedom, if the suspect does not feel the
"heat" but rather feels free to go, then he experiences none of the pressures of custodial interrogation that the Miranda decision sought to
protect against.
Another drawback to this subjective test lies in its application. It
would seem to be a difficult, if not impossible, task for 4a5 court to determine just when an officer forms such a subjective intent.
Chavez-Martinez v. United States-The Probable Cause Test
Still another suggested test for determining when police investigation moves into custodial interrogation is the focus or probable cause
test.4 6 Of course, the word "focus" is derived from Escobedo and, as
pointed out, Escobedo may now lack any real judicial efficacy. 47 The
Ninth Circuit in Chavez-Martinez, however, seemed to adopt this test
as controlling:
We hold that the warnings required in Miranda need not be given
to one who is entering the United States unless and until the ques(1968); Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1968); People v. Arnold, 66

Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), where the suspects while
not under arrest were in custody and entitled to the Mirandawarnings.
44. 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
45. This is not to say that this test lacks all merit. It can be argued that all
police-citizen confrontations contain elements of compulsion. Most citizens when
questioned by the police do respond.

Few feel inclined to say "no comment."

The

Supreme Court in Miranda pointed this out: "[Tihere is still a general belief that
you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the
worse for you if you do not." 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966), quoting from L.
DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958). The guidelines that a
court of law lays down relate directly to police practices. Courts, in effect, set the
applicable guidelines for the police to follow in their law enforcement activities.

Therefore, if the subjective intent of the interrogator test were to prevail, the individual
officer would know exactly when to give the suspect his warnings-at that time he

decides not to let the suspect go.
46. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 362.
47. See note 7 supra.
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tioning agents have probable cause to believe that the person questioned has committed an offense, or the person questioned has been
arrested, whether with or without probable cause. It is at this
point, in border48 cases, that the investigation has "focused" in the
Miranda sense.
Maria Chavez-Martinez was convicted by the district court on two
counts-knowing importation of 130 ounces of heroin and 20 ounces
of cocaine into the United States from Mexico and knowing concealment
and facilitation of the transportation of the same narcotics. 49 She assigned numerous specifications for error.50 For the purposes of this
Note, however, discussion will be limited to her contention that certain
statements made by her to an Inspector Knights while being detained
at the customs office at the Port of Entry, Calexico, should have been
suppressed by the trial court.
Defendant, alone, driving a beige 1959 Plymouth, license
QXR-027, crossed the border on November 10, 1967. There were two
similar license numbers on the then current "look out" list at the Port of
Entry (OXR-027 and OYR-027). Noticing the similarity, a border
inspector on a primary inspection line asked appellant her nationality,
citizenship and whether she was bringing anything from Mexico. To
the last question, she replied, "Nothing." He then asked her to open
the trunk of her car and when she did not seem to know which key to
use, he asked her if she owned the car. She replied, "No, it belongs to
a friend of mine in San Diego."
This primary inspector then referred appellant to secondary inspection where Inspector Knights asked her whether she was bringing
anything from Mexico. He testified that upon receiving a negative
answer he ushered her into the customs office and requested the chief
inspector to watch her while he searched the car. After finding nothing
in his search of the car, Knights returned to the office to check the "look
out," on which he noticed a warning that heroin might be concealed in
the gas tank.
On checking the car again, he noticed what appeared to be a
48. 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1969). Notice that the court here may have
purposely narrowed its decision by limiting its holding to border cases. It is conceivable, therefore, that the Chavez-Martinez panel could adopt a different test in a
case which involved interrogation in a nonborder situation. The court did cite other
border cases to substantiate its opinion. Id. at 539. However, the court also stated
that Miranda contains the focus element. Id. at 538-39. It has already been submitted that Miranda abandoned this Escobedo phrase. See note 7 supra. Although
flexibility might result in adopting different custodial tests in differing situations, confusion, especially at the bar, could be an undesirable end-product. It might also be
asked, if the court did mean to limit this focus or probable cause test to border cases,
why it chose the particular test it did.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1964).
50. 407 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1969).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 21

fresh undercoat on the gas tank and its immediate area to which some
waste material and sawdust was clinging. Knights then tapped the
tank; when it did not "sound right," he called a customs agent, whose
office was in Calexico, to come down and look into the matter.
While waiting for the agent to arrive, Knights, having seen a temporary registration on the windshield of appellant's car, asked her who
owned the car. She replied that a friend living in the Los Angeles area
owned it. He then asked appellant where she had met this person, to
which she replied that she had met him on the street in Tijuana the day
before. In reply to further questioning, appellant stated she had come
to Mexicali to visit a friend, Olga, whose last name she could not remember, and that she was crossing the border with the borrowed car
to visit her mother in Los Angeles. Shortly after this questioning by
Knights, the contraband was discovered by the customs agent. These
statements to Knights, before the narcotics were found, were admitted
at the trial to impeach appellant's testimony and establish various untruths. 51 Appellant assigned their admission as error.
District Judge Crary, in delivering the opinion of the Ninth Circuit,
held that appellant's detention, before the contraband was discovered,
was not a significant deprivation of her freedom. The situation, therefore, did not fall within the custodial definition outlined in Miranda.
The court placed great emphasis on the statutory authority for border
detentions, 2 stating: "[T]o say that by reason of such 'detention' each
[person crossing the border] is in custody, or that an investigation has
focused upon him, would distort the Miranda rule beyond recognition.""3
Conflict within the Circuit?
The possible conflict between Lowe and Chavez-Martinez arises
from the Lowe court's rejection of the focus or probable cause test. 54
The court in Lowe cited the following language in Hoffa v. United
51. Although the questions were not directly related to the later discovered
offense, the Supreme Court has made it clear the relation of the questions to the
prosecuted crime is irrelevant in light of the controlling issue of custody. Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). The Chavez-Martinez court seemed to give some
weight to the fact the questions there asked were not directly related to the narcotics
offense. 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1969).
52. "[AIlI persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall
be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government
....
" 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964).
53. 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1969).
54. See note 48 supra. Although, conceivably, the two cases are distinguishable
because of the border situation in Chavez-Martinez, note the strong language in Lowe
suggesting the reasonable man test should apply to all situations. 407 F.2d 1391,
1396-97 (9th Cir. 1969).
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States55 with approval:
Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call
a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the
minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction. 56
The Supreme Court in Hoffa and the Ninth Circuit in Lowe are saying
that "[t]he police are not required to guess at their peril the precise
moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect. .. .
If the police were, therefore, to misjudge the arrival of probable cause
to arrest and continue the questioning, then statements secured after
probable cause existed would have to be excluded. The determination
when probable cause exists would naturally rest on an appellate court's
finding based on an after-the-fact examination of the relevant circumstances. Yet, the courts in recent years have often "thrown out" arrests not based on probable cause.5 8 It would seem law enforcement
officials would be placed in too complicated a situation--"too much"
probable cause would, on a Miranda basis, invalidate a suspect's
statements, and "too little" probable cause would vitiate the arrest.59
As probable cause to arrest could conceivably exist without custody, it
is submitted that any test that would make probable cause to arrest
the determination of when a suspect's Miranda warnings must be given
misses the point of Miranda'scustody emphasis. 60
This focus or probable cause test may also overlook the basis for
the Miranda guidelines-the need to guard the suspect from overbearing police influences and to protect his privilege against self-incrimination. It is quite possible that the police may have probable cause even
though the suspect himself may be unaware of the police suspicion. In
such a case the compulsive atmosphere would not exist. In Hoffa this
61
distinction is made clear. The investigation had "focused" on Hoffa,
and the police may very well have had probable cause to arrest before
the actual arrest was made, but the Supreme Court could not find any
"compulsion" present that could have undermined Hoffa's will to resist:
55. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
56. Id. at 310.
57. Id.
58. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
59. Any statements secured after an unconstitutional arrest would evidently be
excluded on the basis of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
60. Naturally, any time a suspect is arrested he is in custody. It does not
follow, however, that if a suspect is not under arrest he is not in custody; see
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869, 872
(9th Cir. 1968); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1967); notes 25 & 43 supra.
61. See note 7 supra.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

In the present case no claim has been or could be made that the
petitioner's incriminating statements were the product of any sort

of coercion, legal or factual. The petitioner's conversations with
Partin [an undercover agent] and in Partin's presence were wholly
voluntary. For that reason, if for no other, it is clear that no right
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege62against compulsory
self-incrimination was violated in this case.
Lucas v. United States-Test Based on
Defendant's Subjective Awareness

One final test that has been proposed-a subjective one-would
find custody where the suspect believes that he is significantly deprived
of his freedom.6 3 The Lowe panel flatly rejected such a test: "Whether
a person is in custody should not be determined by what the officer or
the person being questioned thinks; there should be an objective standard."

64

A New York court has pointed out another obvious weakness in
this type of subjective test as compared to a reasonable man test:
[The reasonable man test] is not solely dependent either on the
self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant
nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the
frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question.6 5
As to this last-mentioned subjective test, the Ninth Circuit, in
62. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966). The focus or probable
cause test, although not espoused by this Note, does have a certain degree of validity.
Probable cause is an already familiar word in the law, having a long history of
interpretation. Probable cause exists "[i]f the facts and circumstances before the
officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offense has been committed .... ." Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
The police are familiar with probable cause's dictates (perhaps more so than with a
reasonable man test) and, as the Arizona court put it: "[F] rom that point forward
the police can be expected to pursue the case against the defendant with vigor ...
The time for caution is when the arrest could be made. Everything prior to that
time may reasonably be considered 'the general on-the-scene questioning' which is
permissible under Miranda." State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 256, 431 P.2d 691,
696 (1967).
"The prime inquiry is into the existence of probable cause. If indeed
the police officer had probable cause to arrest, his protestations that the person

detained was 'free to go' must be ignored."
61 (1966).

N.

SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STAND-

ARDS

63. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 362.
64. 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
65. People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d
225, 233 (1967).
It should be remembered, however, that the Supreme Court in past
fifth amendment cases has relied heavily on the mental state of a defendant's mind.
See California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (indigent Negro who had dropped out
of school in the sixth grade); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (indigent
Mexican defendant, seriously disturbed, with pronounced sexual fantasies); Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (near mental defective); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962) (14 year old youth); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15 year old
youth).
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Lucas v. United States, decided after Lowe and Chavez-Martinez, may
have thrown a clog into the machinery of justice with respect to the
custodial interrogation issue. James Lucas was convicted in the district
court on two charges of passing counterfeit United States currency. 6
Appellant allegedly paid for drinks at an Arizona night club with a
counterfeit $20 bill. In response to the manager's call, a number of
officers, both state and federal, went to the scene, and appellant was
taken to a nearby parking lot and questioned by about a half-dozen
officers. Appellant asked one of the officers if he was under arrest and
was told that he was not.67 He was asked how he had come into possession of the $20 bill. After hesitating and remarking he was not
sure that he had passed the bill, appellant told the questioning officer
that he won it in a pool game that evening. These statements were admitted at appellant's trial.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, through District Judge Plummer,
stated:
There is nothing to indicate that appellant disbelieved Deputy
Felix when he told him he was not under arrest. Thereafter, there
was no outward manifestation by defendant's words or 6conduct
to
6
suggest that he considered himself detained or in custody.
If the court in its short opinion meant to adopt this subjective-defendant
test, then clearly the Ninth Circuit stands a sharply divided court, with
Lowe adopting a reasonable man test, Chavez-Martinez a focus or
probable cause standard, and Lucas apparently a subjective-defendant
test.
It seems possible, however, to reconcile the different standards
used in Lowe and Lucas. The defendant in Lucas did not in fact entertain the belief that his freedom was significantly deprived, which rendered the application of the reasonableness test unnecessary. In other
words, in order to find custody within the meaning of the reasonable
man standard, two prerequisites must be present: (1) The suspect
must actually (subjectively) believe that his freedom is significantly deprived; and (2) his belief must be reasonably entertained. In Lucas
the court stressed that the defendant evidently did not hold the subjective belief that his freedom of action was significantly decreased.6 9
Because the first prerequisite of the standard was not met, it was unnecessary to consider the existence of the second. The necessity for a
66. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1964).
67. 408 F.2d 835, 836 (9th Cir. 1969).
68. Id. But see Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), where
the court found custody present although the suspect was told he was not under
arrest. Could it be that a reasonable man would not always believe what he is told
by an officer?
69. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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subjective belief in a significant deprivation of freedom action also
squares with the Miranda rationale of compulsory self-incrimination;
if the suspect did not feel his freedom threatened, then the fifth amendment protections would not be necessary.
Viability of Lowe's Objective Approach
Granted that none of the tests for determining custody mentioned
in this Note are infallible, or crystal reflections of justice from a mirror
of perfect wisdom, a workable test must be found from the standpoint
of the courts and the police. The final choice must be either to adopt
some guidelines, or come to a conclusion such as this:
Thus, one is led to conclude either that Miranda should not apply
to street encounters at all, or else that Miranda should be applied
to all such encounters which involve questioning an individual
about his own conduct. There is no rational middle ground.70
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit's approach in Lowe represents the best possible balancing of all interests. The Supreme Court in
Miranda was concerned primarily with the "inherent compulsion" of an
in-custody situation. The reasonable man approach, although not always flexible enough to compensate for the vagaries of the human composition, does include within its breadth the typical offender. It encompasses the compulsory aspect of the fifth amendment privilege in that
the test recognizes the pressures that are brought to bear on the suspect,
and bases its analysis on the facts known to the suspect that would lead
a reasonable man to conclude that his liberty is significantly threatened.
71
Once the person so concludes, the "conclusive presumption" of compulsion comes into play, and the Miranda warnings must be given before any questioning begins.
The test should also show its workability in a far greater number
of instances than would any test that depended on the idiosyncrasies
of the individual suspect. Indeed, such a subjective-defendant test
would not, in effect, be a test at all, but would necessarily hinge on an
after-the-fact judicial determination of the factual state of the defendant's mind at the time of his confrontation with the authorities. Undoubtedly, this would be an almost impossible72test to apply, and would
leave the police with no guidelines whatsoever.
The subjective intent of the interrogator and focus or probable
cause tests fail because they do not fully recognize the "compulsion"
principle of the fifth amendment 73 and, as with the subjective-defendant
70. La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40, 106 (1968).
71. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 370; text accompanying note 7 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 44 & 57 supra.
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test, would be difficult to apply. 74
Although even the reasonable man test does not provide crystal
clear guidelines because a policeman cannot always accurately gauge
the suspect's personal awareness of the weight of evidence against him,
for the most part police are relatively cognizant of at least some of the
relevant facts. In a case like Orozco, for example, the officers should
have realized that their surrounding the defendant in his bed in the dead
of night would lead a reasonable man to believe that his freedom of
action was significantly impaired.
Elements of Custody
Some thought must be given, then, to just what indicators must be
present, or rather, what in fact constitutes a significant deprivation of
one's freedom of action. In Chavez-Martinez, where the defendant was
actually removed from her car and detained in the customs offices, the
court nevertheless indicated that the appellant's freedom of action was
not significantly deprived. The court based its conclusion, in part, on
the theory that pursuant to the border detention statute 75 a person must
submit to such a detention. Granted that such detention is sanctioned
by the statute, the court seemed to overlook the important point that it is
the fact of detention, not the reason behind it, which determines custody.76 It is submitted, therefore, that the court should have directed
its attention more toward a consideration of the significance of the detention rather than have placed such heavy emphasis on the detention's
statutory justification. As the Ninth Circuit said in Rosario v. Guam:77
For one to be in custody, it is not required that he be in handcuffs
or even that he be advised in express terms that he is under
arrest. The custodial question before the court [in Miranda] was
whether or not, in view of all the circumstances, the appellant's
freedom of movement was, at the time of any challenged interrogation,
restricted in a significant way by the presence of civil author78
ity.

Although the reasons for the restraint are not controlling in a de74. See text accompanying notes 45, 57, & 65 supra. While these tests, in
themselves, should never be controlling in a custody determination, the subjective
realization of the suspect that the investigation has begun to center on him can lead
him to a reasonable belief of the deprivation of his freedom. "The awareness of the
person being questioned by an officer that he has become the 'focal point' of the
investigation, or that the police already have ample cause to arrest him, may well
lead him to conclude, as a reasonable person, that he is not free to leave, that he has
been significantly deprived of his freedom ....
"
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 371
(author's emphasis).
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964).
76. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
77. 391 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1968),

78. Id. at 872.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

termination of custody, this is not to say that the reasons for the detention are irrelevant. They can bear on the issue of whether the particular
restraint was significant. Since the test is that of a reasonable man, the
issue of the purpose of the restraint can be a factor.
In Lowe, the court seemed to arrive at a proper determination of
the question whether a reasonable person in appellant's position would
feel significantly deprived of his freedom of action. The defendant had
been stopped by the officer for erratic driving. Certainly, he was deprived of his freedom, but most citizens in their everyday walks of life
will be subject to such detentions. Often, when a citizen forgets his
driver's license or registration, the officer will make a cursory check to
see if the particular vehicle has been reported stolen. Here, the reason
for the investigation is relevant in determining whether a reasonable man
so stopped would feel his freedom of action to be significantly deprived.
The District of Columbia Circuit in Allen v. United States79 pointed
out:
[Although] this common mishap [of citizens forgetting their permits] produces incidential detention and restraint while the possibility of a stolen car is checked out

.

. [it] does not produce the

kind of custodial situation contemplated by the Miranda doctrine.80
With this in mind, it appears that the court in Lowe correctly held
that the detention of defendant was not significant. Of course, if the
suspect had reason to believe that the officer knew the particular vehicle
was stolen or that the suspect had committed a certain crime, then that
suspect could have reasonable grounds to believe that his freedom was
going to be significantly deprived. However, the suspect's awareness of
his own guilt, at the time he was questioned by the authorities, would
not be sufficient to satisfy the test unless he was aware that the confronting officer also knew of this guilt. In Lowe, evidently, the converse
was true. The officer did not intend to let the defendant go, yet the
defendant was perhaps unaware of this fact since the officer had not
expressed to appellant his intention to detain. 8 ' Without the suspect's
awareness of the limitation on his freedom, none of the evils of custodial
interrogation would seem to exist.
Weaknesses in the Chavez-Martinez Decision

Under the standard applied in Lowe, Chavez-Martinez appears incorrectly decided. Defendant was not held within her car, but indeed,
was whisked 2into the customs office where an inspector was told to
"watch her."
It is not clear whether she knew that the gas tank, where
79.
80.
81.
82.

390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 479.
407 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir. 1969).
407 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1969).
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the contraband was later found, appeared suspicious to the inspector.
Since she was not allowed to leave the customs office, however, defend88 It
ant must have realized, or been told that something was wrong.
was during this period-after the inspector's suspicions had been
aroused and before the customs agent found the contraband-that the
challenged statements were made. It is hard to believe that a reasonable man, under these circumstances, would not have believed that his
freedom of action was deprived in a significant way. It is submitted
that the Miranda warnings should have been given prior to the questioning in the office for at that point the "inherent compulsion" or
"potentiality for compulsion" was certainly apparent. As Chief Justice
Warren said in Miranda:
The entire thrust of police interrogation . . was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for
rational judgment. The abdication of the constitutional privilege
-the choice on his part to speak to the police-was not made
knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of
his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogaindependent decision on his part, caused the detion, and not an 84
fendant to speak.
In conclusion, an apparent conflict exists within the Ninth Circuit
in light of the recent cases of Chavez-Martinez, Lowe, and Lucas. The
court is not alone in this regard, however; there is no real uniformity
within the United States on the issue of when police investigation
merges into, and then becomes, custodial interrogation. The District
of Columbia Circuit explained this dilemma in persuasive metaphorical
terms:
Whether police have left the channel of "investigation" and run onto
the shoals of "custodial interrogation" cannot be determined by
reference to some chart clearly designating the various lights, bells,
bouys and other channel markers. 85
It is still too early to determine whether the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Lowe will have a "lighthouse" effect; but, the court, after a rather
painstaking analysis of the problem, came up with a workable and
sensible, approach to a troublesome and complex problem. While its
decision is certainly not infallible, it does seem to represent a fair balancing of the interests concerned. The Supreme Court in the post-Miranda
cases of Hoffa, Mathis, and Orozco, while touching on the issue of custodial interrogation has not, as yet, made any definitive pronouncements on what it meant in Miranda by a suspect being "deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way."
Before such a ruling comes down, the Ninth Circuit, as well as the
83.
84.
85.

Id.
384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966).
Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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other federal and state courts, will continue to contend, and struggle
with, this crucial issue. Indeed, any issue that relates so directly to
individual freedom and effective crime prevention and detection must
be met head-on, and the clash of interests of individual freedom and
crime prevention minimized within the framework of judicial action and
official implementation.
Don R. Prigo*

D.

Implied Authority and the Attorney-Client PrivilegeStegeman v. United States,' No. 22, 171
(9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969).
The attorney-client privilege often prevents the admission into evidence of helpful and relevant material which may be necessary to the
discovery of the truth. Nevertheless, the courts have felt that the need
to insure an honest and complete disclosure by the client to his attorney, free from any fear that the facts might be made public,2 outweighs
the possibility that important evidence will be lost. In considering problems of waivers of this important privilege, this public policy behind its
creation must be kept in mind.
Professor Wigmore has defined the attorney-client privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself
or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 3
*

Member, Second Year Class.

1. An en banc rehearing was held on November 12, 1969.
2. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381,
397 (8th Cir. 1892); International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44
F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 741
(S.D. Cal. 1953); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 506-07, 267 P.2d 1025,
1029 (1954). See also Brief for Appellant at 26, Stegeman v. United States, No.
22,171 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE].
Compare with the often quoted definition stated by Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950): "The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a)
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
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It is well recognized that the privilege applies also to advice given by
the attorney to the client." The public policy behind this extension of
the privilege is simply that the attorney's advice will often "reveal the

substance of [the] client's communication." 5
One problem often arising in regard to the attorney-client privilege
is that of defining the limits of the attorney's authority to disclose confidential communications. Case law has firmly established that the privilege is the client's, and only he can waive it. 6 Can the attorney, then,
intentionally or accidentally, destroy the privilege by disclosing such

communications to an adverse party without express authority from the
encountered this problem in the case of
client? The Ninth Circuit
7
Stegeman v. United States.
In Stegeman, the defendants. were convicted of knowingly and

fraudulently concealing assets during an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.8

On appeal, they claimed that the trial court violated their

attorney-client privilege by allowing a letter containing advice from their

attorney to be introduced into evidence over their objection.9 The
long-time attorney for the Stegemans, Mr. Morley, had traveled to Canada to discuss the bankruptcy action with his clients. On his return,

he wrote a lengthy letter to the defendants, supplying them with refor the purpose of securing primarily (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing
a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by
the client." Id. at 358-59.
4. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956); Prichard v. United States,. 181 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.), affd,
339 U.S. 974 (1950); 8 in 1 Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18
F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); I.E.S. Corp. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 559,
564, 283 P.2d 700, 703-04 (1955); Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270,
279, 55 A.2d 211, 217 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947).
5. Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D.
463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); accord, Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.
1965). In addition, see Brief for Appellant at 25.
6. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Russell v. Second Nat'l
Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 278, 55 A.2d 211, 217 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); State v.
Sullivan, 60 Wash. 2d 214, 217, 373 P.2d 474, 475 (1962); see Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Brief for Appellant at 26.
7. No. 22,171 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
9. Defendants also claimed error in the introduction of statements taken by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of the failure of the agents to
give warnings within the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 434
(1966). Stegeman v. United States, No. 22,171 at 1-2 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969). A
third assertion of error was in the court's failure to instruct the jury that since the
defendants were in Canada, beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, they had
no duty to reveal their assets, only a duty not to hide them. Id. at 6-9. The Ninth
Circuit rejected both of these claims.
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quested information concerning the bankruptcy proceedings. At the
end of the letter, he advised them that although they had violated the
bankruptcy laws by concealing assets, they could avoid criminal prosecution by sending the records of all their assets to the trustee and returning from Canada. Morley also stated in the letter that he had arranged with the trustee to postpone any criminal proceedings for a few
days to give the Stegemans an opportunity to attend to the matter. He
sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Pendergrass, attorney for the trustee in
bankruptcy, with a "BC" notation at the end.' °
At the trial, the Stegemans claimed that they were acting on the
advice of another attorney who had advised them that their actions during the bankruptcy proceeding were lawful and that therefore they had
no knowledge that any of their actions were illegal. The prosecution,
seeking to prove that the Stegemans knew their actions were fraudulent,
introduced the copy of the letter to refute the claim that the Stegemans
had been acting in good faith.
The trial court found that Morley was acting in what he considered
to be the best interests of his clients and that he had authority to act
in their behalf. The judge felt that the sending of the letter was within
this authority and ruled that the disclosures destroyed the confidential
nature of the communication. The Ninth Circuit" approved the ruling,
finding that Morley was acting in good faith in trying to save his clients
from prosecution and that he had implied authority to disclose the communication. In its decision, from which Judge Byrne strongly dissented, the court relied on Himmelfarb v. United States,' 2 United States
v. Bender,'3 Banks v. United States,'4 and Fratto v. New Amsterdam
Fire Insurance Co.,' 5 in stating that "'special circumstances may show
that the client impliedly authorized the attorney to make disclosures to
the third person,' and in such circumstances the privilege does not
apply." 6
Analysis of Ninth Circuit's Case Authority
A careful analysis of these cases reveals that the majority's re10. A "BC" notation is an abbreviation for "Blind Copy." Such a notation is
put on the copy and not on the original so that the party receiving the original has
no knowledge that a copy was sent to someone else.
11. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Merrill and Browning and District
Judge Byrne.
12. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
13. 218 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1955).

14.

204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953).

15.

359 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1966).

16.

Stegeman v. United States, No. 22,171 at 5 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969),

quoting Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338

U.S. 860 (1949).
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liance on them was misplaced and that they are, as Judge Byrne points
out, distinguishable from the facts in Stegeman. In Himmelfarb, the
majority's principal authority, the disputed evidence included testimony
by an accountant employed by the defendant's lawyer. The client,
speaking to his attorney in private, revealed information regarding his
tax returns. The attorney later passed this information to the accountant. The defendant claimed the information was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The court there found that the defendant
knew of the employment of the accountant, had himself revealed other
similar information to the accountant, and had signed papers at the
accountant's request. These facts constituted the special circumstances
creating the implied authority for the attorney to destroy the privileged
status of the information by passing it on to a third party."
Judge
Byrne argued that in Stegeman the defendants had no knowledge that
any party would have access to any of their communications to Morley,
and thus there were no special circumstances giving rise to any implied
authority. 8
In Bender, the disputed evidence was a worksheet used by defendant's accountant in preparing the defendant's tax forms. The
worksheet was turned over to government officials by the defendant's
attorney in an attempt to explain discrepancies in the tax forms. The
Seventh Circuit found that the attorney had the requisite authority to
turn over the document.' 9 However, as Judge Byrne pointed out, the
case is inapposite. In Stegeman, the communications were originally
privileged, whereas in Bender, since the information was disclosed to
the accountant before the attorney-client relationship began, it had never
been within the attorney-client privilege.2 0
In the third authority, Banks, the evidence objected to was the
written answers made by the defendant to questions prepared by government representatives. The questions were given to the defendant's
lawyer who procured the answers from the defendant and returned
them to the officials. The answers were supplied for "the sole purpose
of giving [them] to [the special agents]" and were thus outside the
17. 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949). There was also the question in
Himmelfarb of whether communications made in the accountant's presence were also
within the privilege. The Ninth Circuit held that they were not, because the accountant
could not be considered an indispensable party and his presence therefore destroyed the
privilege. Id. Contra,United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1961).
18. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920 n.3 (2d Cir. 1961), where
the court suggests that Himmelfarb is distinguishable in that there was evidence showing the client knew the information was for transmission to a third party. This
would support Judge Byrne's distinction.
19. 218 F.2d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1955).
20. Stegeman v. United States, No. 22,171 at 11 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969)
(dissenting opinion).
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privilege. 21 The Eighth Circuit found that the attorney was acting as
"defendant's agent with a power of attorney" rather than as a mere
attorney.22 In such an instance, his acts within the scope of his authority
were binding upon the principal. Since neither the facts nor the holding in Banks were in point, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on it in the
Stegeman case appears erroneous.
The majority's final authority, Fratto v. New Amsterdam Fire Insurance Co., involved a suit to collect on a group of insurance policies
in which the insurers refused to pay the claim on the grounds that the
insureds started the fire. The insurers objected to the admission into
evidence of reports to them on this issue by their counsel. The Third
Circuit, however, held that the privilege had been lost because the attorney had sent copies of the reports to other companies who were not defendants.2 3 Although this would seem to bring Fratto into line with the
facts in Stegeman, in Fratto, the district court found as a fact that the
disputed reports had originated as verbal reports made by an adjuster
to the attorney which the attorney merely passed on to third parties.2 4
Although this point is not discussed in the Third Circuit's brief opinion,
it would indicate, as Judge Byrne stated, that the report was never
within the privilege. Communications not originally within the privilege do not become privileged merely by sending them to an attorney.2 '
Here again, the case can be distinguished from Stegeman; its use as
authority seems inappropriate.
In summary, it appears that Judge Byrne's analysis was correct;
the majority's holding does not in fact find support in the cases it cites
as authority. The communication was not outside the privilege as
in Bender and Fratto,there was no agency as in Banks, nor were there
any special circumstances as in Himmelfarb. Even though the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on these cases may have been wholly unjustified,
the next issue to be examined is whether there were any facts in Stegeman sufficient to warrant a finding of implied authority.
Implied Authority
The Restatement of Agency has defined implied authority as
authority to do an act . . . created by written or spoken words
21.
22.
23.
24.

204 F.2d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 1953).
Id.
359 F.2d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 1966).
Fratto v. Northern Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 262, 271 (W.D. Pa. 1965).

25.

Id. at 271; San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d

451, 456, 359 P.2d 925, 928, 11 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (1961), quoting Grand Lake
Drive In v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 122, 127, 3 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626 (1960);

City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 238, 231 P.2d 26,
31 (1951).
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or other conduct of the principal which reasonably interpreted,
causes the agent to believe26that the principal desires him so to act
on the principal's account.
Applying this definition, the courts have ruled that the attorney-client
relationship creates a rebuttable presumption that the attorney has authority to act in procedural matters incidental to the management of the
litigation. 21 In addition, cases have held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that an attorney has implied authority to conclude a
compromise settlement.2"
Nevertheless, as appellants in Stegeman
claimed,29 the wiser position seems to be that an attorney has no authority to enter into negotiations unless the client instructs him to do
so.3 0 Furthermore, the cases illustrate that "in the absence of express
authority, an attorney has no power to surrender substantial rights of
his client."3 1 Clearly the rights of the Stegemans were substantially
affected by the admission of their attorney's letter into evidence; thus,
specific express authority to send it should have been shown before allowing the letter to be used as evidence.
The government, nevertheless, sought in Stegeman to have the
implied authority arising from the mere attorney-client relationship
extended by arguing that an attorney must have great freedom to act
in what he considers to be the best interests of his client, especially in
criminal cases.32 Because of the serious consequences that may befall
the client, however, logic seems to compel the conclusion that in criminal cases, the client should have even more control over the handling
of the case. It would appear, therefore, that Judge Byrne was cor26.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26

(1957).

27. See Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv., 263 F.2d 948, 953-54 (5th Cir.
1959); American Chem. Paint Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 164 F.2d 208, 209 (6th Cir.
1947); Weiner v. Luscombe, 19 Cal. App. 2d 668, 66 P.2d 151 (1937); Terre Haute
Brewing Co. v. Ward, 56 Ind. App. 155, 162, 102 N.E. 395, 398 (1913); King Constr.
Co. v. Mary Helen Coal Corp., 194 Ky. 435, 439, 239 S.W. 799, 800 (1922); Smith
v. Mulliken, 2 Minn. 319, 322 (1858).
28. Trope v. Kerns, 83 Cal. 553, 556, 23 P. 691, 692 (1890).
29.

Brief for Appellant at 14.

30. West v. Bank of Commerce & Trusts, 167 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1948);
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946); Barthelmas v.
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1939); Preston v. Hill,
50 Cal. 43, 51, 54-55 (1875); Jones v. Noble, 3 Cal. App. 2d 316, 320, 39 P.2d 486,

488 (1934); Bums v. McCain, 107 Cal. App. 291, 294, 290 P. 623, 625 (1930).
31. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949); accord, Gagnon Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, Inc., 45 Cal. 2d 448,
460, 289 P.2d 466, 475 (1955); Hoagland v. Chargin, 134 Cal. App. 2d 466, 474,
286 P.2d 931, 936 (1955); Fowlkes v. Ingraham, 81 Cal. App. 2d 745, 747, 185
P.2d 379, 380 (1947); Redsted v. Weiss, 71 Cal. App. 2d 660, 663, 163 P.2d 105,
108 (1945).
32. Appellee's Reply to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 33, Stegeman v.
United States, No. 22, 171 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969).
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rect in arguing that unless expressly instructed to do so, the attorney
should have no power to enter into negotiations.
Analysis of Wigmore's Distinction
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
first part of Professor Wigmore's distinction between privileged and
nonprivileged communications. Part one states:
(1) Since the attorney has implied authority from the client. . . to
make admissions and otherwise to act in all that concerns the management of the cause, all disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily
made to the opposing party or to third persons in the course of
negotiations for settlement, or in the course of taking adverse
steps in litigation . . . are receivable as being made under an
implied waiver of privilege, giving authority to disclose the confidences when necessary in the opinion of the attorney. This is so
unless it appears
that the attorney has acted in bad faith toward
33
the client.
The above quote clearly indicates that Wigmore's theory is fundamentally different from the Restatement definition of implied authority.
In Wigmore's analysis the mere fact of the attorney-client relationship gives rise to "an implied waiver of privilege" allowing the attorney
to make disclosures where he deems necessary. Wigmore would apply
this broader power to situations in which the attorney was acting in
negotiating a settlement or in taking adverse steps in litigation-clearly
a major departure from the idea that the attorney-client relationship
creates an implied authority to act in only procedural matters.
If Wigmore's theory is correct, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit
accurately applied it to the facts in Stegeman 4 If, on the other hand,
the position of the Restatement is taken that the mere attorney-client
relationship should not create authority to act in other than procedural
matters, consideration should then be given to the problem of whether
there were any "special circumstances" creating an implied authority to
disclose the advice. Under Himmelfarb and the Restatement view of
implied authority, it is clear that the creation of implied authority to do
more than act in procedural matters requires some overt act on the part
of the client; the mere act of retaining counsel should not be, and in33. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2325.
34. In Stegenian, the attorney was acting in trying to settle his client's bankruptcy problems and thus he would have the implied authority to make disclosures to

third parties. Stegeman v. United States, No. 22,171 at 5 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969).
Judge Byrne's argument that negotiating a settlement is not "within an attorney's general authority to manage the litigation" and any unauthorized statements made in the
course of such negotiations do not destroy the privilege is clearly at odds with Wig-

more's theory. Id. at 13 (dissenting opinion); accord, Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort
Marine Ins. Co., 240 F. 573, 581 (1st Cir. 1917); Vogt Freezers, Inc. v. New York
Eskimo Pie Corp., 59 F.2d 99, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
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deed has been held not to be, sufficient to authorize the waiver of any
substantial right."' The Stegemans insisted that they gave no consent
or instructions to Morley concerning the letter and Morley himself
testified that he had no express authorization from the defendant's to
send the trustee's attorney the portion of the letter containing his advice. 36 Furthermore, there were no extrinsic facts, as in Himmelfarb,
that can be relied on to support a finding of implied authority. In
Himmelfarb, the defendant knew of the employment of the accountant,
had revealed other similar information to the accountant, and had
signed papers at the accountant's request. There was no such conduct
on the part of the Stegemans, nor any analogous thereto which warranted the Ninth Circuit's holding that Morley was endowed with the
implied authority to disclose the confidential communication in question.
It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss part
two of Wigmore's distinction in its opinion. Part two states:
(2) All other voluntary disclosures are inadmissible, except so far
as the special circumstances show an implied authority of disclosure
over and above the general authority to conduct
from the3 client
7
litigation.
The use of this portion of Wigmore's theory would certainly have been
more consistent with the citing of Himmelfarb, which dealt with special
circumstances. The Stegeman opinion, however, clearly confuses the
issue of the extent of implied authority arising from the attorney-client
relationship with the issue of whether special circumstances existed.
If the court was seeking to expand the implied authority arising out of
the relationship, then to talk in terms of "special circumstances" was
unnecessary and irrelevant. If the court desired to base its decision on
"special circumstances," however, it should have relied on part two of
Wigmore's theory, not part one. It seems that the Ninth Circuit was
forced to use part one of Wigmore to uphold the ruling of the trial
court because there were no "special circumstances" present. Thus
the use of Himmelfarb can be understood only as a strained attempt
by the court to find support for its reliance on a theory which had no
basis in case law when Wigmore first propounded it in 1905. 3 8 Wigmore's theory was merely a proposed solution he felt would help solve
the problem of the extent of the attorney's implied authority to make
35. See notes 27-33 & accompanying text supra. See Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548, 553 (4th Cir. 1950), where the court held that
no authority to impair the rights of the client would be implied merely from the
attorney-client relationship.
36. Stegeman v. United States, No. 22,171 at 13 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969)
(dissenting opinion).
37. 8. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2325.
38. Only one case, Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 118-19, 121 N.W.2d 176,
180 (1963), has applied Wigmore's theory.
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disclosures to third parties. Judge Byrne, on the other hand, has
substantial support in the cases and legal writings he cites for his
39
position.
It is the opinion of this author that Wigmore's theory gives the
attorney too broad an authority when there exist no special circumstances creating an implied authority. Employment of this theory places
too much power to waive the privilege in the hands of the attorney.
If the privilege is to mean anything to the client its waiver cannot be
dependent upon what the attorney considers to be proper strategy.
To allow the attorney the power to destroy the privilege by his extrajudicial disclosures, other than in procedural matters, would be to undermine the client's confidence that he can confide all to his attorney,
the very basis on which the privilege rests.
In the final analysis, whether Morley's advice is to be deemed
privileged and inadmissible should rest on the character of the communication. If it was intended as a confidential communication between attorney and client, it should be regarded as privileged and inadmissible as evidence against the client despite any disclosure. Where,
as in the Stegeman case, a substantial right is involved, any inference
concerning waiver of the privilege should be drawn in favor of the
client. On this basis, the Ninth Circuit, having reheard the case en
banc, should reverse the trial court's ruling and reestablish the client's
control over waiver of the privilege.
Gregory C. Paraskou*

E.

Evidentiary Use of Prior Felony ConvictionsShorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428
(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 454 (1969).

The Ninth Circuit in Shorter v. United States' reaffirmed previous
decisions giving a prosecutor the right to impeach the character of the
criminally accused witness with his prior felony convictions. In affirming Shorter's conviction, the court explicitly rejected the rule of Luck v.
United States,2 which encourages the trial judge to exclude evidence of
a defendant witness' prior felony convictions when the probative value
39. Stegemen v. United States, No. 22,171 at 13 (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 1969)
(dissenting opinion).
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 454 (1969).
2.

348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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of a conviction is thought to be outweighed by possible prejudice.' Although the Ninth Circuit thereby takes a position contrary to the expressed sentiments of the vast majority of legal writers, 4 it is suggested
that the court's decision is sound, supported by ample precedent and
desirable in any system of justice essentially designed to discover truth.
On June 20, 1967, Leroy Shorter, armed with a double-barrelled,
sawed-off shotgun, robbed the Hibernia Bank in San Francisco. During the course of the robbery, he took more than $10,000 at gun point
and threatened to kill the assistant manager of the bank. Shorter was
captured on July 11, 1967, and his trial commenced on September 18,
1967. 5 After the defendant had informed the court he intended to
testify in his own behalf, the trial court ruled, over his objection, that
it would admit evidence of his prior convictions, if offered. In obvious
trial strategy, counsel had defendant admit to his prior convictions during direct examination. Shorter was thereafter convicted.
On appeal, he urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt the Luck rule and
reverse his conviction. 6 The court rejected Shorter's arguments and
held that the Luck rule was not the law of the Ninth Circuit. 7 It reaffirmed its support of the orthodox rule, for years the accepted practice
in the vast majority of American courts," which allows the prosecutor to
impeach the character of the criminally accused witness with prior felony convictions. Generally, legal critics have been extremely critical
of this accepted practice;9 lengthly and vociferous, 10 their arguments
against the rule have run the gamut from relevancy to extreme prejudice.
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
stated that the prosecutor does not have an absolute right to introduce the prior felony
convictions of the criminally accused witness for the purposes of impeachment. The
court encouraged the trial judge to exercise discretion in deciding in the particular case
whether or not "the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility." Id. at 768. If the probative relevance of the prior convictions are found to be "far outweighed" by the prejudice, the Luck rule requires that the trial judge refuse to admit the evidence of

convictions.

See id. at 768.

4. E.g., Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. RFv. 166 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time
jor Reform, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Spector].
5. Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1969).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8.

See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 94

(1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK].
9. E.g., Ladd, supra note 4; Spector, supra note 4.
10. One writer was so persuaded by his own arguments that he concluded that
a significant reason for the continued existence of the general rule is inertia. See
Spector, supra note 4, at 8.
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Commonly Advanced Arguments
One argument advanced by the critics is that since evidence of
crimes involving dishonesty has a stronger relevancy to credibility than
does evidence of other serious crimes, all crimes not involving dishonesty should be excluded." It is similarly argued that while crimes
of violence might logically tend to show that the defendant is a man of
violent disposition, they have no bearing on credibility.' 2 The answer
to these contentions is found in the reasoning of the continuous and
nearly unanimous decisions finding prior felony convictions relevant."3
One such early case was Gertz v. FitchburgRailroad,4 in which the problem was discussed by Justice Holmes. Holmes stated the basis for the
determination that prior crimes are relevant to credibility is that they
tend to show the witness "is of general bad character and unworthy of
credit."' 5 The chain of inferences toward relevancy begins with a concession that the conviction shows a "general readiness to do evil."' 16
From this consideration, the jury may infer that the defendant would
have a "readiness
to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has
7
lied in fact."'The Supreme Court of New Hampshire more recently expressed
the common sense reasons behind the relevancy of prior convictions: 8
What a person is often determines whether he should be believed. When a defendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case,
he asks the jury to accept his word. No sufficient reason appears
why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking
them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life, this is
probably the first thing that they would wish to know. So it seems
to us in a real sense when a defendant goes onto the stand, "he
11. See, Note, Impeaching the Accused by His Prior Crimes-A New Approach
to an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 919, 922 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, 19
HASTINGS L.J.].

12. Spector, supra note 4, at 4. Spector doubted whether armed robbery was
relevant to credibility.
13. See MCCORMICK § 43, at 94.
14. 137 Mass. 77 (1884). This case was an action to recover for personal
injuries. The defendant railroad impeached the injured plaintiff's testimony with the
plaintiff's record of prior felony convictions. The plaintiff sought to rebuild his
character.

The trial court apparently

ruled that this form of impeachment was

analogous to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, and that a witness could
not rebuild his character when he had been impeached by prior inconsistent statements.

Therefore, the trial court refused to permit the plaintiff to rebuild his character after
a showing of prior convictions.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the trial

court on the ground that introducing prior convictions was an attack on character,
and therefore, the plaintiff witness was entitled to rebuild his character.

15. Id. at 78.
16. Id.
17.
18.

Id.
State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956).

March 1970]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

takes his character with him".... Lack of trustworthiness may
be evinced by his abiding and repeated contempt for laws which
he is legally and morally bound to obey . . . though the violations are not concerned solely with crimes involving "dishonesty
and false statement."' 9

In short, all prior felony convictions are relevant and therefore admissible on the issue of credibility 20 because they tend to show the general bad character of the witness. Crimes involving dishonesty may be
stronger evidence on the issue of credibility because the chain of inference is more direct, but this does not require the conclusion that crimes
not involving dishonesty are irrelevant. 2 '
One writer has concluded that the introduction of prior felonies
would violate the Federal Constittion.2 2 He contends that their introduction constitutes a derrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination, 23 violates due process of law, 24 and is so prejudicial that it denies
the defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.25 Chief Justice
Warren answered this argument in Spencer v. Texas:2 6
In view of this uniform tradition, it is apparent that priorconvictions evidence introduced for certain specific purposes relating to the determination of guilt or innocence, other than to
show a general
criminal disposition, would not violate the due
2
process clause.. 7
Some writers have been especially critical of admitting convictions
that are remote in time on the ground that even if the prior crimes once
had a bearing on credibility, they have since lost their relevance due to
the interval of time between that former conviction and the present
19. Id. at 293-94, 123 A.2d at 746.
20. Id. at 294, 123 A.2d at 746.
21. The chain of inference for crimes involving dishonesty is that the witness
has been dishonest in the past, and it is likely that he will be dishonest again, and
hence it is likely that he has lied in this case.
22. See generally Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of
Prior Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 168 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, 37 U. CIN.
L. REv.].
23. Id. at 179.
24. Id. at 185.
25. Id. at 174.
26. 385 U.S. 563 (1967).
27. Id. at 578. In Spencer, the Supreme Court upheld a Texas recidivist statute
which permitted the prosecutor to introduce the defendant's criminal record to the
jury as part of his case-in-chief. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the theory that
it was unnecessary for the prosecutor to introduce the prior crimes evidence until
after the issue of guilt had been decided. See id. at 570. He argued that evidence
used only for recidivist purposes has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant in the present case, whereas evidence introduced for the purpose of impeachment does have a legitimate purpose because it tends to show that the witness'
credibility "is qualified by his past record of delinquent behavior." Id. at 577.
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case.2 8 Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed this contention in State v. Hawthorne.29 In a concurring opinion, he stated:
We must start with the undeniable proposition that when
the possibility of prejudice is greatest, it will not so overwhelm the
probative value of the conviction as to warrant its exclusion.
Specifically, if the conviction is fresh and is for the same species
of crime involved in the trial and thus the capacity for prejudice is
at its maximum, proof of the conviction will be received ....
Yet it is claimed that somehow the passage of time upsets the
scale. I agree that time diminishes the probative value of a conviction, but I think it equally clear that time also reduces the risk
of prejudice. I find it hard to believe that a conviction a juror
finds too old to bear upon credibility will still be young enough to
seduce him upon the issue of guilt.30
In addition, the majority opinion noted that from a practical standpoint
a prosecutor will hesitate before introducing a very old conviction for
fear of an adverse reaction from the jury." These arguments are persuasive, for it is indeed difficult to imagine a jury giving undue weight
to an extremely remote conviction. While a former conviction may
have lost some of its probative value, it has also lost some of its prejudice. Thus, it would seem unnecessary to frame a rule to exclude
former convictions merely because they are remote in time.
Several critics have asserted that it is not necessary to impeach the
credibility of the defendant by evidence of prior crimes since the jury
will naturally tend to regard the defendant's testimony with suspicion
because of his interest in the outcome of the trial.312 Clearly, the jury
is entitled to know if the witness is likely to lie, but it should have a
stronger basis for determining credibility than an inference that the witness is likely to lie from the mere fact of his interest in the outcome of
the case. Most witnesses and especially criminal defendants are interested in the outcome of the case in which they testify. The recognition
of this fact is one of the rationales behind the rule prohibiting leading
questions. 3 Yet, if interest in a case were thought to be sufficient impeachment, surely the additional rules of impeachment would never
have been developed. Since evidence of prior crimes is relevant to the
issue of credibility, that evidence would seem a necessary method of
impeachment.
28. See Spector, supra note 4, at 6.
29. 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967).
30. Id. at 145-46, 228 A.2d at 689-90.
31. Id. at 141, 228 A.2d at 687.
32. See Spector, supra note 4, at 15; Note, ProceduralProtections of the Criminal
Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule
Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARv. L. REV. 426, 440
(1964); Note, 19 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 11, at 925.
33. See Ladd, supra note 4, at 168.
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Fear of Extreme Danger of Prejudice
Each of the foregoing arguments has been answered in turn, but it
should be realized that they do not constitute the main thesis advanced by
the critics for an exclusionary rule. The underlying essence of the critics'
attack upon the use of prior felony convictions is that the orthodox rule
operates to the overwhelming prejudice of the accused.3 4 They argue
that even if the evidence be relevant, the orthodox rule constitutional,
and the history of admissibility long, the evidence should be excluded
because it3 5has a natural tendency to prejudice the jury against the
defendant.
The jury, they contend, might conclude from the evidence that the
defendant is a bad man and, therefore, must have a propensity to commit the crime charged.3 6 In addition, the jury might be inclined to convict the defendant on the theory that he probably escaped full punishment for his past crimes.1 7 It is claimed that limiting instructions in
this context serve no useful purpose 8 because the jury is unable to restrict their use of the convictions solely for the purpose of impeaching
the defendant's credibility as a witness. 9 Because the jury would tend
to use the convictions for unauthorized purposes, and because the accused is greatly prejudiced by the unauthorized use of convictions, the
critics conclude that the best rule would be to exclude evidence of prior
convictions entirely. The essence of these arguments is the asserted
unfairness to the accused. Since it must necessarily be the product of a
value judgment, however, this argument, on further reflection, is open
to the counter-argument that the opposite result might be unfair to society. The principal issue then is the validity of the value judgment.
A vital element of a trial designed to determine truth is the testimonial reliability of the witness.40 The factfinder must know if the
witness is credible in order to determine how much weight to give his
testimony. From a legal standpoint it would be utterly unfair to the
prosecution to allow a witness having a prior record of felony convictions to appear as a person of blameless life, because the jury would
then be inclined to give his testimony much more weight than it was
entitled to. "The object of a trial is not solely to surround an accused
34. See id.; Spector, supra note 4; Note, 19 HASTINaS L.., supra note 11; Note, 37
U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 22.
35. Note, 19 HASTINGS L.J., supranote 11.
36. See Ladd, supra note 4, at 185.
37. 1 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 650 (3d ed. 1940).
38. See Note, 19 HAsTINcS L.I, supranote 11, at 924.
39. Justice Jackson's famous quote in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440
(1949), is frequently quoted by legal critics in support of their position: "The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury. . . all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Id. at 453.
40. Ladd, supra note 4, at 167.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

with legal safeguards but also to discover the truth.""1 Since the credibility of a witness is vital in the search for truth, clearly, the state has a
legitimate interest in the introduction of the witness' prior crimes for
This interest outweighs the possibility of
purposes of impeachment.
42
prejudice to the accused.
It is conceded that the defendant may be slightly prejudiced by the
introduction of his criminal record. The basis for the general rule,
however, is not that the defendant suffers no prejudice, but that, despite the fact that he might suffer some prejudice, knowledge of his
credibility is more important in the search for truth.43 It is suggested
that, in reality, the possibility of prejudice is slight. If it were true, as
the majority of legal writers argue, that the criminally accused witness
is overwhelmed with prejudice by the mere introduction of his criminal
record, the present rule would surely be different. The most recent
scholarly study of the American jury system has concluded that the
effect of evidence of prior crimes on the judge and jury is slight since
"neither the one nor the other can be said to be distinctively gullible or
'44
skeptical.
Should the accused, nevertheless, still believe he will be prejudiced
by his prior crimes, he usually has the option to prevent the jury from
hearing evidence of them. If the defendant does not testify, the prosecutor will not be permitted to introduce evidence of his prior convictions.45 Another factor that serves to negate the prejudice thought to
be suffered by the accused is his option to ask the judge for limiting instructions. It is probably true that such instructions are not completely
effective because of the impossibility of compartmentalizing the human
mind.4 6 It is suggested, however, that these instructions do have some
effect in lessening the possible prejudice that the accused might suffer.
Members of the jury have a duty to obey the judge's instructions,47 and
even if they are not completely successful in limiting the use of prior
felony convictions to the issue of credibility, the fact that they are likely
to try lessens the possible prejudice to the accused.
41.

State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).

42.
43.
44.

See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 563, 576 (1967).
See id. at 577-78.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 180 (1966).

This study was
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 563, 565 n.8
(1967).
45. However, in states authorizing one stage recidivist trials the prosecutor is
allowed to introduce the defendant's criminal record whether or not he takes the witness stand. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 563 (1967). Furthermore, the prosecutor may
introduce prior convictions to show plan, handiworks of the accused, motive, or absence
of mistake. MCCORMICK § 157 at 328-30.
46. See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956).
47. E.g.,
1 (1958).

CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL

(CALJIC), Instruction No.
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The Luck Rule: A Possible Compromise?
While critics have naturally continued to argue that the entire general rule should be eliminated, they have nevertheless been willing to
accede to a compromise, since, in their opinion, a compromise would
be better than the present rule. At first, it was hoped that Rule 21 of
the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence would offer a workable and
more just solution to the problem.4 8 This rule would prohibit the
prosecutor from impeaching the accused's character on cross-examination unless the defendant specifically put his character in issue.49 Rule
21 would also limit the crimes usable by the prosecution against the
accused to those involving dishonesty. 3 It soon became apparent, however, that Rule 21 was unpopular with the various American legislatures. 5 1 Consequently, recent critics of the general rule have expressed
hope that American courts would adopt the rule of Luck v. United
States, and thereby alleviate much of the asserted prejudice inherent
in the present rule.8 2
The federal courts have traditionally afforded prosecutors the undeniable right to impeach the character of the criminally accused witness by introducing his prior felony convictions. 53 Recently, however,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has promulgated the
above mentioned "Luck rule," which encourages a trial judge in criminal trials to exercise discretion in determining whether to admit prior
felony convictions for the purposes of impeachment.5 4 In Luck, the
District of Columbia court stated that the prosecutor does not have the
absolute right to introduce prior felony convictions while cross-examining the accused. 5 Instead, the trial judge should exercise discretion in
determining whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence "far outweighs" the probative value of the prior conviction on the issue of
credibility.5" In making this determination, the judge should consider
48. UNiwoam RULE OF EVIDENCE 21; see Holbrook, Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 32, 40 (1954).
49. Id.
50. It has been asserted that if Rule 21 were adopted, a smart defendant could
easily keep his character from becoming an issue and that the jury is not likely to
make any adverse inferences against the defendant for not placing his character in
issue. Note, 19 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 11, at 926.
51. The California and New Jersey legislatures have both specifically rejected
Rule 21. The California Law Revision Commission recommended passage, but the
legislature rejected the recommendation. 7 CAL. LAW REVISION COMm'N REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS & SOLUTIONS 141-44 (1965); CAL. EvID. CODE § 787.

52.

See Spector, supra note 4, at 21; Note, 19 HASTINGS L.., supra note 11, at

53.
54.
55.
56.

Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1969).
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 768.
Id.

929.
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the following factors:
[T]he nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and above all,
the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth
in a particular case for the jury
to hear the defendant's story than
57
to know of a prior conviction.
The courts that have adopted the Luck rule have not denied that
prior felony convictions are relevant. 58 They argue, instead, that it is
unfair to the defendant to place him in the dilemma of being afraid to
testify in his own behalf for fear of having the jury hear his past record,
or not testifying and have the jury infer guilt from his silence. 59 Another argument in favor of the Luck rule is that truth might be better
served by allowing the defendant to testify6 ° because the factfinder is
better able to determine the truth if both sides are fully heard.
In numerous decisions, courts accepting the Luck philosophy have
nevertheless held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by
admitting the defendant witness' criminal record for the purposes of
impeachment. 6 1 By admitting the convictions for impeachment purposes, they have conceded that in these cases the probative value of the
convictions was sufficiently important to merit their admission.
It seems, that the dilemma argument advanced by the courts favoring the Luck rule is inconsistent. If, in fact, it is unfair to place the
defendant in the dilemma of testifying and having his record exposed,
or not testifying and having the jury infer guilt from his silence, this
unfairness is not precluded by the Luck rule. If the trial judge, after
considering the factors advanced in Luck, decided to admit defendant's
prior felony convictions into evidence, the defendant's dilemma still
exists. 62
Ninth Circuit Rejection of Luck

The Ninth Circuit's decision to specifically reject the Luck rule
57. Id. at 769.
58. Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1969); See United States
v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1968); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d
936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
59. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown
v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
60. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The obvious
counter-argument to this contention is that allowing a liar to pose as a truthful person
does nothing to enhance truth.
61. E.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1968); Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
62. The dilemma is, in fact, not unfair to the accused; it merely poses a question of trial strategy for the criminally accused defendant. No dilemma exists for the
ordinary witness.
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was based in part on the traditional argument for admitting prior crimes
for the purposes of impeachment-that the evidence is probative on a
material issue in the case, and hence should be admitted. 63 The court
also stressed the practical considerations that make the Luck rule
unappealing.64 For example, how is the judge to determine whether
the prejudicial effect of the impeachment will outweigh the probative
value of the prior crimes evidence? This question is in fact unanswerable, despite the standard suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit,
because it would be impossible to determine in advance whether or to
what extent the jury would be prejudiced by the introduction of the
evidence of a conviction. It appears that the Luck rule compels the
trial judge to weigh "things which are, in fact, not susceptible of being
weighed."6 The Ninth Circuit also indicated that the trouble and confusion that would be caused by the adoption of the Luck rule could not
be justified in terms of benefit to the defendant. Even under the Luck
doctrine, the defendant will have an extremely difficult time in proving
in the particular case that it is "far" more important, in the fair administration of justice, to leave the jury in ignorance of the defendant's
to elect at his own risk whether
credibility than to require the defendant
66
to take the witness stand in his defense.
In addition to the above arguments, an examination of the decisions tends to indicate that defendants in jurisdictions adhering to Luck
are, perhaps, not receiving- the anticipated benefits of the rule. The
vast majority of these decisions have held that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion by admitting the prior felony convictions.67 It
can only be concluded that these courts, in spite, of their adherence to
Luck, recognize the probative value of prior felony convictions. 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also recognized the impracticality of the Luck rule.69 In State v. Hawthorne, the court held that the
factors suggested by Luck would inject too many extraneous matters
into the trial, 70 and concluded that even after a consideration of these
extraneous factors, a rational decision would be difficult. 71 Not only
do the factors suggested by Luck insert extraneous material into the
63.

Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1969).

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1968); Gordon
v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
68. See Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1969).
69. State v. Hawthorne, 49 NJ. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967).
70. Id. at 146-47, 228 A.2d at 690.
71. See id. at 146-47, 228 A.2d at 690.
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trial, but consideration of them consumes a great deal of the court's
time. In the case of Laughlin v. United States, 72 for example, the issue
of whether to admit the criminal record of the defendant for impeachment purposes consumed an entire day and a half of valuable calendar
time. 73 The possibility that a judicial determination on whether to admit a prior felony conviction could consume a day and a-half of court
time, should, of itself, render the Luck rule completely unacceptable.
The Ninth Circuit has taken the better approach to the problems
posed by the appellant in Shorter v. United States.74 Its approach comes
closer to achieving the ultimate goal of any trial, the determination of
truth. The relevancy of prior convictions to the issue of credibility has
been firmly established by American courts; in fact, not even the Luck
courts have seriously doubted the relevancy of the convictions. Since
the determination of truth is vital to any case, the legitimate interest of
the state in introducing prior felony convictions often outweighs the possibility of prejudice to the accused.
Ernest H. Tuttle III*

F.

Preventing Conflict of Interest Between Codefendants
Represented by Single Counsel

Whenever two or more defendants are prosecuted at the same
trial, a potential conflict of interest exists. If such a conflict coincides
with representation of codefendants by the same attorney, the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel of one or more of
the codefendants may be infringed. Although the Ninth Circuit has
had several opportunities to consider the problem in depth,' it has
consistently failed to take advantage of these opportunities to formulate
definitive standards to aid the district courts in preventing conflicts of
interest. A system of standards is definitely needed to deal with this
very common situation, and in the interests of efficient judicial administration and of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
the Ninth Circuit should provide such a system.
72. 385 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
73. Id. at 293.
74. 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1969).
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. E.g., Juvera v. United States, 378 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1967); see notes 26-30
& accompanying text infra.
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Conflict of Interest Defined
"Conflict of interest," in the context of this Note, refers to the
situation in which the best defense of one defendant necessarily involves

action detrimental to the defense of the other defendant. 2

When co-

defendants in such a situation are represented by the same counsel,
the simultaneous presentation of the most effective defense for each defendant is impossible.' One defendant, therefore, will suffer for the
benefit of the other. For this reason, courts that have considered
the problem have held that a conflict of interest between codefendants

which hinders the ability of counsel to best defend one of his clients
will be considered prejudicial to that client. 4 Such has been the rule
2. In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966), the court stated that "an
obvious divergence of interests exists between a defendant who denies his guilt and a
codefendant who not only confesses his own complicity but also accuses the other of
participation in the crime." Id. at 73. In People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876,
46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965), the court set out the following guidelines: "Conflicts of
interest ... may arise when it would profit one defendant to attack the credibility of
another; when counsel would be restricted in final summation because he might injure
one defendant by arguments in favor of another; when one defendant has a record
of prior felony convictions and the others do not; when the defenses of codefendants
are factually inconsistent . . . ." Id. at 878, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (citations
omitted). In State v. Karston, 247 Iowa 32, 72 N.W.2d 463 (1955), it was found
that "[Olften the question will arise as to which [codefendant] was the planner of the
crime, which took the leading part, or in many other ways each may desire to attempt
to throw the onus upon the other." Id. at 37, 72 N.W.2d at 466.
3. For example, see State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (1960),
wherein the court stated: "It is apparent that relator has been deprived of adequate
representation because defense counsel, representing both defendants in a single trial,
could make no decision of consequence without harming one or the other of the defendants." Id. at 339, 101 N.W.2d at 413. In Commonwealth v. Small, 434 Pa. 497,
254 A.2d 509 (1969) (dissenting opinion in equally divided court), the dissenting
judge stated that "[when codefendants have conflicts of interest] trial counsel is placed
in the anomalous posture of being able to help one client only at the expense of the best
interests of the other. So when this occurs, defense counsel is forced to seek a
compromise solution which will perhaps at best result in convictions of a lesser charge
for each of his clients, while not completely absolving either one." Id. at -, 254 A.2d
at 511.
4. E.g., Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966); In re Buffalo
Chief, 297 F. Supp. 687, 689 (S.D.S.D. 1969); United States ex reL Platts v. Myers,
253 F. Supp. 23, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1966); State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 199, 417
P.2d 510, 523 (1966); State v. Ebinger, 97 N.J. Super. 23, 27, 234 A.2d 233, 235-36
(App. Div. 1967); Commonwealth ex reL Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176
A.2d 641, 643 (1962). It is universally recognized, however, that joint representation
is not per se prejudicial. E.g., Watkins v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 351, 352 (9th Cir. 1969);
Glavin v. United States, 396 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 926
(1968); United States v. Berriel, 371 F.2d 587, 587 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966); United
States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964);
United States v. Langston, 194 F. Supp. 891, 894 (W.D. Pa. 1961); People v.
Trotter, 273 A.C.A. 575, 582, 78 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (1969); State v. Youngblood,
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since Glasser v. United States,5 in which the Supreme Court established
that the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel includes the
right to protection against the limitation of the effectiveness of counsel
arising from a conflict of interest.6 Today, the great majority of courts
require merely a showing of conflict of interest on the record to reverse
the conviction of any defendant adversely affected.7 In effect, any
actual conflict of interest is assumed to preclude effective assistance of
counsel,8 and under Glasser, any infringement of the right to such
assistance is prejudicial.
217 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 1968); People v. Chapman, 66 Ill. App. 2d 124, 127, 214
N.E.2d 313, 315 (1965); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 293, 206 A.2d 138, 144
(1965); State ex rel. Favors v. Tucker, 143 W. Va. 130, 140, 100 S.E.2d 411, 417
(1957); see In re York, 283 P.2d 567, 571 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 839 (1955).
5. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
6. Id. at 70, 76. The right to "effective and substantial aid" of counsel was
first mentioned by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932),
where denial was held an infringement of due process of law. Since Glasser, "effective
assistance of counsel" has been held to be a fundamental right, even though it is
seldom the subject of specific discussion. E.g., Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271, 274
(1945); Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967); Lugo v. United
States, 350 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965); Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461,
463 (5th Cir. 1962); McGuire v. United States, 289 F.2d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1961);
Stickney v. Ellis, 286 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 888 (1961);
Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953
(1956); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1954); People v.
Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 774, 447 P.2d 106, 111-12, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 15-16 (1968).
The courts that have discussed the meaning of "effective assistance of counsel"
have most often referred to it in reference to a standard of minimal competence
of counsel allowable before the right to counsel can be held to have been infringed,
or due process of law denied. E.g., Sanchez v. United States, 398 F.2d 799, 800
(9th Cir. 1968); Dalrymple v. Wilson, 366 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1966); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
See generally Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HAxv. L. REv. 1434 (1965); Note, Right to Counsel: Effective or Competent Representation, 20 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. RaV. 259 (1964).
7. Glavin v. United States, 396 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v.
Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 944
(9th Cir. 1963); In re Buffalo Chief, 297 F. Supp. 687, 689 (S.D.S.D. 1969);
Martinas v. Brierley, 273 F. Supp. 260, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1967), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (1962);
United States ex rel. Platts v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 23, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1966); State v.
Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 199, 417 P.2d 510, 523 (1966).
The apparent contrary holding in United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 244
(6th Cir. 1966), where the court stated: "We read this language [in Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. at 761 as requiring a showing of prejudice against the party
claiming deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights," may be reconciled since the case
implies that the "prejudice" is the conflict of interest, rather than how the conflict of
interest infringes upon the effective assistance of counsel.
8. Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18 VANI. L. Rv.
1920, 1926 (1965).
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The traditional method of protecting codefendants with shared
counsel from the consequences of conflict of interest has been inquiry
by the trial judge before trial to determine whether a conflict exists
and whether the defendants realize the dangers involved in joint representation." The guidelines established for such inquiry are found in
the admonition of Johnson v. Zerbst,10 as applied in the Glasser decision:
"This protecting duty [of the court concerning the right to the assistance of counsel] imposes the serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver [of the assistance of counsel] by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to Counsel, whether
there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial
court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination
to appear upon the record.""1
Although the Glasser opinion uses this quotation merely as support for
its analogy between the right to the assistance of counsel dealt with in
Johnson and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, courts
since have used "intelligent and competent" as the level of understand12
ing required for defendants to waive their right to separate counsel.
Similarly, many trial judges have substantially followed the admonition
that the question of the existence of a conflict must be clearly determined by the trial court."3
The prevailing attitude of the appellate courts has been that the
9. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), where it is stated: 'The
trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel."
Id. at 71. "Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused
has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the
defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting that counsel undertake
to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first client
." Id. at 76.
Although the Court in Glasser was concerned with the narrow situation of requiring a defendant's retained counsel to represent another accused, the holding implies
that it is the trial court's responsibility to guard against the possibility of conflict
whenever there is shared counsel, whether it be retained or appointed. See United
States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 335 (2d Cir. 1964); Lebron v. United States, 229
F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 974 (1956); Kennedy v. Sanford, 166 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 864 (1948).
10. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1967);
Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1954) (by implication). Appellate courts have not discussed how this standard is to be used in their respective jurisdictions. Rather, trial courts have tended to apply this broad standard informally
upon the authority of Glasser. Thus, there are few cases where fault is found with a
trial court's determination of the competency of this type of waiver.
13. E.g., United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 335 (2d Cir. 1964); Mohler v. United States, 312 F.2d
228, 230 (7th Cir. 1963).
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discretion of the trial judge, if he inquires along the general guidelines
set out in Glasser, will adequately protect the codefendants' right to
effective assistance of counsel. 14 Yet, the effectiveness of this approach has been haphazard at best; 1 frequently, the resulting inquiries,
advisements and determinations do not even appear in the trial record. 16
Moreover, the lack of any specific delineation of the duties of the
trial judge has left unclear the proper extent of judicial inquiry." Adding to this confusion, some courts have placed importance upon
whether the defendants objected to joint representation or brought any
existing conflict of interest to the attention of the judge.' 8 Other courts
14. This may safely be assumed from the complete absence before 1965 of any
standards or instructions directed by appellate courts to trial judges to better insure
their discretion would adequately protect the rights of codefendants. See Kennedy v.
Sanford, 166 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 1948). Also, this statement is implied from the
general holding that joint representation, per se, is not prejudicial since this necessarily
means the decision whether codefendants will be jointly represented rests with the
trial judge and will only be reversed when a conflict-i.e., an obvious error in discretion-appears to have been in effect during trial. See cases cited note 4 supra.
15. Cases are common where an obvious conflict of interests was not noticed at
trial. E.g., Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966); Case v. North Carolina,
315 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Buffalo Chief, 297 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.S.D. 1969);
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Rundle, 294 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United
States ex rel. Platts v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Wright v. Johnson,
77 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1948); People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 421
(1968); State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 75 So. 2d 856 (1954); State v. Tapia, 75 N.M.
757, 411 P.2d 234 (1966); People v. Sprinkler, 16 App. Div. 2d 705, 227 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1962); see People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10
(1968).
16. E.g., Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lollar v.
United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Robertson v. United States, 252
A.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969); Watkins v. United States, 240 A.2d 656,
657 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968); Lord v. District of Columbia, 235 A.2d 322, 323
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967). Of course, cases where an obvious conflict exists and yet
is not dealt with by the judge are in all probability cases where no effective determination of possible conflict was made, much less placed on the record. See cases cited
note 15 supra.
17. Compare Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1967),
with United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 406 (2d Cir. 1966). Compare Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), with United States v. PazSierra, 367 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1966), and Campbell v. United States, 352
F.2d 359, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
18. E.g., Fields v. United States, 408 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1969) (by
implication); Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675, 681, (5th Cir. 1955) (by implication); People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 417, 348 P.2d 577, 583, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20
(1960); People v. Goodwin, 261 Cal. App. 2d 723, 729, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247, 251
(1968); People v. Jolke, 242 Cal. App. 2d 132, 140, 51 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177 (1966);
People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 878, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (1965); People
v. Byrd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 646, 649, 39 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645-46 (1964); Sotomayor v.
State, 224 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Bass, 101 Ill. App. 2d
259, 263, 243 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1968); State ex rel. Melton v. Bomar, 300 S.W.2d
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have emphasized that the ethics of the Bar will prompt attorneys not to
represent more than one client at a time when a conflict of interest
would hamper defense efforts. 19 Nevertheless, the practice of leaving
to the discretion of the individual
the extent of the pretrial inquiry
20
trial judge is still widespread.
In this atmosphere of confusion, the traditional system of preventing
the infringement of the right to effective assistance of counsel caused

by conflicting interests can easily fail to supply meaningful protection

to the accused at the trial level. 21 This necessarily means that too often
the protection of this right must be seen to by the appellate courts. The
attendant undesirable consequences are obvious. Unneeded expense
and a crowding of appellate dockets come to mind at once. More
important is that with merely a printed record to rely on, an appellate
court will never be in a position to protect a codefendant to the degree

that is possible before and during trial.22 If the trial court, through
lack of diligence, does not discover a conflict between the interests
of the defendants, 23 the appellant will be saved from unjust conviction
875, 876 (Tenn. 1957).
The holdings contra are to be preferred. The possible existence of a conflict
of interest should be considered by the appellate court solely in regard to the danger
presented to a fair trial. It is not reasonable to expect a defendant to object to joint
representation on the grounds of a conflict of interest, or to require a defendant
to bring a conflict to the attention of the judge. A layman cannot be assumed to
know the legal significance of a conflict brought about by joint representation. It
would also not be reasonable to preclude the defendant from asserting prejudice
merely because his attorney failed to notice a conflict of interest, even if the attorney's error was merely an oversight. See Wynn v. United States, 275 F.2d 648, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Harris, 155 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D. Cal. 1957);
People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 774, 447 P.2d 106, 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 16
(1968), disapproving People v. Byrd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 646, 39 Cal. Rptr. 644
(1964); Lord v. District of Columbia, 235 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967);
cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962).
19. E.g., United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1966); cf.
People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal. 2d 569, 576, 140 P.2d 24, 28 (1943); Baker v. State, 202
So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1967); Pressly v. State, 220 Md. 558, 563, 155 A.2d 494, 497
(1959).
20. Federal courts of appeals maintaining the traditional view include: the Fifth
Circuit-White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822, 824 (5th Cir. 1968); the Sixth CircuitUnited States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1966); the Seventh CircuitCurry v. Burke, 404 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1968); the Ninth Circuit-Kruchten v.
Eyman, 406 F.2d 304, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1969); and the Tenth Circuit-Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968).
21. Evidence of this appears in the great number of cases where obvious conflicts
were not recognized by the trial court. See cases cited note 15 supra.
22. See Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1967): "Like
the famous tip of the iceberg, the record may not reveal the whole story." Disagreement over the meaning of the record is the reason for the two opinions in Commonwealth v. Small, 434 Pa. 497, 254 A.2d 509 (1969) (equally divided court).
23. See cases cited note 15 supra.
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only if the conflict can be gleaned by the appellate court from the record
of the trial itself. For example, the appellate court may never be able
to discern from the record what defenses or strategies may have been
discarded or modified by counsel for the benefit of one defendant to
the prejudice of the other.14 It is clear that conscientious protection
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel should require that
more precise standards be applied by the trial judge in order to ascertain
more effectively the existence of a conflict of interest.
Although Congress recognized the problems inherent in conflict of
interest cases when it passed the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, it failed
to outline what specific actions a trial judge should take to determine if
there are any conflicts of interest. Section 2(b) of the Act merely restates the principle of the Glasser decision:
The court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants who have
such conflicting interests that they cannot properly be 25
represented
by the same counsel, or when other good cause is shown.
As a consequence, the Act does not attack the main weakness of
the traditional method of protecting codefendants from the harm of
conflict of interest.
The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit exemplifies a jurisdiction which adheres to the
traditional method of preventing conflict of interest. While this circuit
consistently states that it believes a conflict of interest between codefendants with the same attorney will deprive the accused of the effective
assistance of counsel,2 6 it has never suggested that a trial judge should
do more to protect the codefendants than Glasser requires. 27 The
standard procedure applied by the Ninth Circuit is to reverse only
when a conflict of interest is pointed out by the appellant or is seen in
the court's own review of the record. 28 In a recent case before the
24.
25.
26.

See Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1968).
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
E.g., Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963).

"It is well

recognized . . . that the existence of a conflict of interest on the part of counsel representing two different defendants deprives the accused of the effective assistance of
counsel ......

Id. at 944.

27. The Ninth Circuit has not even attempted to clarify the procedure required
by section 2(b) of the Criminal Justice Act. The Second Circuit, on the other hand,
has stated "extreme care" should be taken before the appointment of joint counsel
and even suggests separate counsel be appointed "where there is any possibility of a
conflict of interest, except . . . where with full knowledge of the facts the defendants

themselves request to be represented by the same counsel."

Morgan v. United States,

396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1968).

28.

Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1967); Lugo v. United

States, 350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.

1963); Chavira Gonzales v. United States, 314 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1963).

Note the
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court, the appellant suggested that before trial the judge should discuss
with the defendants the problems relating to the representation of several defendants by one counsel, and point out, in particular, the possible
disadvantages that might arise should any conflicting interests develop. 29
The Ninth Circuit, with little comment, rejected this argument as without merit.3 0
The District of Columbia Circuit
Rather than leave the method of preventing conflict of interest
to the discretion of the individual trial judge, with the questionable results already discussed, 31 the District of Columbia Circuit has met the
conflict of interest problem head-on. The Glasser decision and the
Criminal Justice Act have been implemented with specific instructions
and standards. Recent decisions in this circuit have attacked the most
common factor depriving codefendants of the effective assistance of
counsel-inadequate inquiry by the trial judge.
In 1965, in a case where joint counsel was retained, this circuit
held that the trial court has a duty to ascertain whether each codefendant is aware of the potential risk of joint representationand nevertheless has knowingly chosen to share counsel.3 2 It was suggested that
an "affirmative determination" be made by the trial judge that the
defendants intelligently chose to be represented by the same attorney
and that the decision was not governed by poverty or by ignorance of
the availability of assigned counsel.3 3 The court noted:
[Retention of single counsel] does not relieve the trial judge of
his responsibilities to inform the defendants of their right to have
[separate] counsel appointed, to inquire into the facts to determine the desirability of having separate counsel, and to appoint
continuing reliance in these cases upon the same approach to the problem of conflict
of interest. But see Glavin v. United States, 396 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1968), where
the Ninth Circuit appears to have lowered its requirements for reversal. The appellant
need only show "some possibility of conflicting interests, and hence of prejudice."
Id. at 727 (emphasis added). Compare this statement in Glavin with the other cases
cited note 7 supra.
29. Juvera v. United States, 378 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1967).
30. Id. The court rejects the argument "for the reasons recently noted by
us in Lugo v. United States, [350 F.2d 858 (1965)]." 378 F.2d at 437 (citations
omitted). The Lugo case, however, never mentioned this argument. The Ninth Circuit
has thus ruled on the issue while it has avoided discussing it in depth. The recent case
of Kruchten v.Eyman, 406 F.2d 304, 311 (9th Cir. 1969), perpetuates the erroneous
statement in Juvera that the suggestion had been reasoned to be without merit in Lugo.
Oddly enough, the stand that the trial judge need not discuss the possibilities and
dangers of conflict of interest with the defendants appears to be reaching the status
of policy in the Ninth Circuit, and yet has never been even superficially analyzed.
31. See cases cited note 15 supra & accompanying text.
32. Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
33. Id.
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[separate] counsel under appropriate circumstances. 34
In March of 1967, the District of Columbia Circuit established
new standards concerning the placing on the record of the judge's inquiries, determinations and advisements.3 5 It was held that when the
record did not indicate whether the judge advised the defendants of the
possible risks involved in joint representation or of their rights under the
Criminal Justice Act to separate appointed counsel if their interests
were in conflict, the burden was placed upon the Government on
appeal to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were
not prejudiced as a result of joint representation.3 6
In its next case in the area of conflict of interest,3 7 the District
of Columbia Circuit made extensive changes in its procedure that solved
the entire problem. Rather than continue the development of clearer
and more encompassing standards for the trial court to apply, the
court instituted a procedure requiring initial appointment of separate counsel in every case." 8 While the circuit has not stated the effect
of noncompliance with this instruction, subsequent cases in the District
of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals have concluded that noncompliance is "error." 9 On appeal, the Government will have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that such error was not prejudicial. At
present, this is the only circuit which requires separate counsel initially
in all cases.4"
While the appointment of separate counsel would end any possibility of conflicts of interest resulting in infringement of the effectiveness or representation, it is extremely doubtful such a basic change
would be seriously considered by the Ninth Circuit. Its longstanding
dependence upon the general directions of the Glasser decision 4 ' indicates a strong desire to leave maximum discretion with the trial judge
in each case.
34.

Id. at 361 n.2.

35.

Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

36.

Id. at 247.

37.

Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

38.

Id. at 125-26.

39.

Robertson v. United States, 252 A.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969);

Watkins v. United States, 240 A.2d 656, 657 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968); Hall v.
United States, 236 A.2d 57, 59-60 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967).
40. This procedure has been suggested by the Second Circuit in Morgan v.
United States, 396 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cr. 1968). See note 27 supra. Also suggesting separate counsel initially are Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073
(10th Cir. 1968); People v. Odom, 236 Cal. App. 2d 876, 879-80, 46 Cal. Rptr.
453, 455 (1965); State v. Robinson, 271 Minn. 477, 481, 136 N.W.2d 401, 405,
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965); Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731, 733
(Ky. 1965).
41. See notes 26-30 supra & accompanying text.
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A Needed Change in the Ninth Circuit
In view of the general confusion about conflict of interest 42 and
of the innovative procedures developed by the District of Columbia Circuit, 43 it is clear some comprehensive standards should be adopted by
the Ninth Circuit.4 4 Conflicts between the interests of codefendants are
so common45 it can hardly be denied that close inquiry and discussion
of possible dangers by the trial judge should be mandatory whenever
codefendants are represented by joint counsel. Failure to maintain a
standard procedure may allow conflicts to go unseen throughout trial. 46
This results in a difficult problem for the appellate court: Was there
truly prejudice resulting from a hidden conflict, or is the appeal frivolous? It is suggested that the Ninth Circuit establish the following
procedure or its equivalent to be used as a guide by district courts
within its jurisdiction:
(1) The judge must discuss with the codefendants their rights
under section 2(b) of the Criminal Justice Act. This discussion should
appear on the record.4 7
(2) If joint counsel is retained rather than appointed, the judge
must determine for the record by deligent inquiry:
(a) that
all codefendants are aware of their right to retain sepa48
rate counsel,
(b) that all codefendants intelligently waive their right to retain
separate counsel if they choose to proceed with retained joint counsel,
(c) in cases where a defendant does not desire to share his retained counsel, that his codefendant is aware of his right to have separate counsel appointed if he is financially unable to retain his own
counsel,4 9 and
(d) that after questioning defendants, defense counsel and the
prosecution, no conflict of interest exists. or is likely to arise.5 0 If it is
42. See note 17 and cases cited in notes 18 & 19 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
45. See Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1965); State v.
Montgomery, 182 Neb. 737, 739, 157 N.W.2d 196, 198 (1968).
46. See cases cited note 15 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 10-11 & 25 supra.
48. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). The Court states in part:
"There is yet another consideration. Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided
assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an
accused should be respected." Id. See also People v. Robinson, 42 Cal. 2d 741,
747-48, 269 P.2d 6, 10 (1954).
49. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (b)
(Supp. IV, 1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
50. Any information gained by the judge probing the defenses or admissions of
the defendants, if self-incriminating, would probably not be admissible at trial. See
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apparent a conflict, actual or potential, exists, the court must insure
that the defendants realize the danger it presents to effective assistance
of counsel. 5 ' Furthermore, even though the defendants waive their
rights under this procedure, the court, to prevent prejudice, may exercise, in its discretion, its power to sever defendants from a joint trial. 2
(3) If defendants are financially unable to retain counsel, the
judge on the basis of his determinations in 2(a)-(d) above shall:

(a) appoint separate counsel if it is apparent some conflict of interest may exist, or
(b)
appoint joint counsel if it is clear no conflict of interest
53
exists.
(4) A previously unseen conflict that comes to light during the
trial shall result in 54
immediate declaration of a mistrial as to any codefendants affected.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), where the Court held that testimony
by a defendant in support of a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence under the fourth
amendment is not admissible against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes
no objection. The Court found it intolerable for a defendant to have to surrender one
constitutional right in order to assert another. Id. at 393-94. This holding probably
lays to rest the reasoning in United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d Cir.
1966), which the Second Circuit uses to attack the suggestion of the Campbell case that
the trial judge must make an "affirmative determination" that the codefendants have
chosen to be represented by the same counsel. See text accompanying notes 32-34
supra. A short but lucid discussion of the Simmons case in relation to a closely analogous matter appears in Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 1969)
(Ely, J., dissenting).
51. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1962), where the Court
states that presuming a waiver of fundamental rights from a silent record is impermissible.
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 states: "If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in any indictment or
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may . . . grant a severance
of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires .... "
Granting severance is at the discretion of the judge, and may only be attacked
on appeal on the ground of abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 409 F.2d
8, 9 (6th Cir. 1969); Flores v. United States, 379 F.2d 905, 908-09 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 1966); Barton v. United
States, 263 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1959).
While it is true that mere severance will not cure ineffective representation caused
by one attorney remaining as counsel in the face of a conflict of interest, it is hard
to believe that if such action was indeed warranted counsel would not grasp the
situation. The ethics of the Bar would require an attorney to refuse to serve codefendants jointly when it was clear a conflict of interest would prevent him from
adequately representing one or both of them. This is also the reason it is doubtful
any greater action than severance would ever be needed. See cases cited note 19
supra.
53. See Lewin, A Tale of Two Districts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 528, 551 (1968).
54. This suggestion contains the same safeguards for codefendants whether they
have retained or appointed counsel. Although a court which appoints counsel appears
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It is suggested that this procedure is sufficiently specific to insure
that the rights of the accused are protected both before and during trial
and yet flexible enough for the judge to tailor his specific actions to the
situation. Since the use of joint counsel is not per se prejudicial,5 5
reversal on appeal should not result from the mere failure to follow the

suggested procedure.

It would be appropriate to consider such a

failure to be error, but not necessarily prejudicial error.5" Where the
procedure is not followed, a requirement similar to that established
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Lollar v. United States5 7 should
be imposed. The Government should bear the burden of proving be-

yond a reasonable doubt that the failure to follow the procedure did not
lead to a prejudicial diminution in the effectiveness of any defendant's

representation. Although this allocation of the burden of proof should
rarely result in reversal where a defendant was not actually prejudiced,

it is sufficiently rigorous to prompt the Government to insist that the
suggested procedure be followed before trial.
This procedure draws strong support through analogies to the
federal requirements for a valid waiver of counsel and a valid plea of
guilty. The standards applicable to the procedures for a proper surrender of these rights are similar in that they both require the record
to reflect the judge's determination that the defendant realizes the con-

sequences of his action.
The basic standards a judge must meet to insure a valid waiver of
counsel are stated in Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-

cedure 58 and the Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Zerbst.59 Rule

to take on the responsibility of preventing an infringement of rights caused by such
appointment, no valid reason can be found to protect any less diligently the rights of
other defendants who may have the good fortune to have just enough money to hire
their own attorneys. This is supported by the majority of cases and writers. E.g., Lollar
v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Porter v. United States, 298
F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir.
1954); Holland v. Boles, 225 F. Supp. 863, 865-66 (N.D.W. Va. 1963); People v.
Donohoe, 200 Cal. App. 2d 17, 26, 19 Cal. Rptr. 454, 460-61 (1962); Lord v. District of
Columbia, 235 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 300, 335 (1965); Note, Right to Counsel: Effective
or Competent Representation, 20 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 259, 263-64 (1964); Note,
The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18 VAND L. REv. 1920, 1932-34
(1965).
55. See cases cited note 4 supra.
56. See cases cited note 39 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
58. "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the
proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44, 327 U.S. 866 (1945). This rule was amended in 1966 to read in
part: "Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have
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44 requires the judge to inform the accused of his right to counsel and
to assign counsel unless the accused waives this right. Johnson imposes
upon the judge the responsibility of "determining whether there is an
intelligent and competent waiver of this right by the accused,"6 and
suggests that the determination appear on the record."' In Von Moltke
v. Gillies,62 the Supreme Court expanded the requirements for a valid
waiver by stating that the accused must have an apprehension of what
is involved in an effective defense.6 3 At present, therefore, the federal
courts require for a valid waiver that an accused must be aware of his
right to counsel and of the problems inherent in defending himself.
The procedure suggested for the Ninth Circuit in cases of codefendants with single counsel is designed to determine whether a conflict
of interest exists and to insure that the defendants have an apprehension
of the possible dangers inherent in joint representation. In addition,
the record must show that the defendants were, in fact, aware of their
right to separate counsel yet, comprehending the dangers, knowingly
waived their right. The similarity to the requirements for a valid
waiver of counsel is clear. If the federal courts require such determinations to prevent an incompetent waiver of counsel, there would seem
to be a need for similar determinations to prevent an inadvertent loss
of effectiveness of counsel. This result should follow even though
denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel requires reversal in
any case, 64 while denial of the right to separate counsel requires reversal only where prejudice is shown to have resulted.
The federal requirements for a valid guilty plea are set out in Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,6 5 recently construed by
the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States6 6 Rule 11 requires
that a judge not accept a plea of guilty without first addressing the
counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial
appearance before the commissioner . . . unless he waives such appointment."
R. CRIM. P. 44.

FED.

59.
60.
61.

304 U.S. 458 (1948); see text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
304 U.S. at 464-65.
Id. at 465.

62.
63.

332 U.S. 708 (1948).
Id. at 724.

64.

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304

U.S. 458 (1938).

65. "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court,
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. . . . The court shall not enter

a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for
the plea."

66.

FED. R. GRIM. P. 11.

394 U.S. 459 (1969).
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defendant personally to determine whether the plea is made voluntarily
and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. Prior to the McCarthy decision, these requirements were loosely construed by the various federal courts.6 7 In that
case, however, the Supreme Court required strict adherence to Rule 11
in order to fulfill its purposes of assisting the judge "in making the
constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is
a competent record of the factors reletruly voluntary," and insuring
68
vant to the determination.
The analogy that can be drawn between the procedures for determining the competence of guilty pleas and the suggested procedure for
determining the existence of a conflict of interest, like the first analogy,
derives its strength from the requirement in both procedures of a determination for the record by the trial judge that the defendant possessed a
certain state of awareness of his position and the prospects to be expected from following a contemplated course of action. Both procedures, if closely followed, not only would protect rights of the accused
and create a record of the proceedings, but also would "discourage
. . . the numerous and often frivolous69 post-conviction attacks on the
constitutional validity" of the judge's action.70 While both procedures
are sufficiently encompassing to insure justice in all situations, they are
not overly restrictive. Both leave the method and specific content of the
individual inquiry to the judge. They merely require an end result that
may safely be assumed to be valid in all cases. Inasmuch as the standards for determining whether or not a guilty plea is competent are wellsettled in federal procedure, no reason can be seen why comparable
standards should not be applied to the similar determination of whether
a conflict of interest exists and whether proceeding with joint counsel
is done with a knowledge of the risks.
This second analogy can be taken one step further. Under Rule
11, if a trial judge is not satisfied that there is a factual basis for a
guilty plea, he will not accept it.71 Likewise, if the inquiries of the trial
judge reveal a conflict of interest between the codefendants, the judge
should not have to proceed with trial in the face of a conflict, but should
have the option either to appoint separate counsel or to sever the trials,
67. Id. at 468-69. An exception was the Ninth Circuit in Heiden v. United
States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
68. 394 U.S. at 465.
69. E.g., Juvera v. United States, 378 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Berriel, 371 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1967); Chavira Gonzales v. United States,
314 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1963); Mohler v. United States, 312 F.2d 228, 230
(7th Cir. 1963); Davenport v. State, 7 Md. App. 89, 253 A.2d 768, 772 (1969);
State v. Engle, 5 N.C. App. 101, 167 S.E.2d 864, 865 (1969).
70. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
71. See note 65 supra.
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even if the codefendants for some reason should desire otherwise.7 2 In
both cases, the judge's discretion is used to prevent anything less than a
fair proceeding for the accused.
It is obvious from recent decisions 73 that the Ninth Circuit still
considers it more appropriate for a trial judge to use his own discretion
on whether a waiver of rights is made "intelligently," than for the
Ninth Circuit to establish a set of standards for the trial court to apply.
The procedure employed by the Ninth Circuit to protect codefendants
from the effects of conflicts of interest, however, has been shown to be
confusing and often lacking in significant protection for defendants at
the trial level. This Note has suggested a different procedure. On the
basis of its similarity to the procedures developed by the Supreme Court
in Rules 11 and 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to handle
the analogous problems of guilty pleas and waiver of counsel, this procedure, while still leaving a great deal to the discretion of the trial
judge, should avoid the defects in the present approach to the conflict
of interest problem. A concern for the rights of the accused in the first
instance, and the more efficient administration of justice in the second,
72. See note 52 supra. The Supreme Court in Schaffer v. United States, 362
U.S. 511 (1960), said: "We do emphasize . . . that, in [a joint trial], the trial judge
has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does
appear." Id. at 516. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d
758 (7th Cir. 1967), said: "The wording of [Rule 14) would indicate a continuing
duty during the trial on the part of the court to avoid prejudice as a result of joinder."
Id. at 762.
While most cases dealing with Rule 14 are concerned with prejudice arising
from out-of-court statements of one codefendant incriminating another defendant,
Rule 14 could be properly invoked in the situation where prejudice arises from a conflict of interest between defendants with shared counsel.
73. Kruchten v. Eyman, 406 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1969). See note 30 supra.
For an analogous case which illustrates the Ninth Circuit's attitude toward waiver of
counsel, see Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969). In the original
opinion in this case, No. 20,517 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968), quoted in Hodge v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion), a three-judge
panel appeared to establish stricter standards for the Ninth Circuit in the area of
waiver of counsel when it stated that the trial judge must insure that an accused understands the consequences of his waiver, something more than was required by the Von
Moltke decision. See 414 F.2d at 1053; see text accompanying note 62 supra. When
the case was reheard en banc, however, the court rejected the holding of the first
opinion, and reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's previous position that the proper standard
was whether the defendant's assertion of his right of self-representation was "intelligent," as this word was used in the Johnson decision. The court stated: "The question
[before the trial judge] was simply whether the defendant understood the charges against
him and was fully aware of the fact that he would be on his own in a complex area
where experience and professional training are greatly to be desired." 414 F.2d at
1043. See generally 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1002 (1970); 20 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1969).
The approach to protecting the defendant from an improper waiver in the Hodge
decision is quite similar to the court's traditional approach to protecting against conflicts of interest between codefendants represented by the same attorney.
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should move the Ninth Circuit at least to consider this more structured
procedure for preventing prejudice arising from conflicting interests.
Clark A. Miller*

G.

Waiver of Trial Objections-Curry v. Wilson,
405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1968).

On October 6, 1959, George Albert Curry killed a police officer
during a shooting spree. When he was arrested immediately after the
shooting, it was obvious that he was extremely intoxicated. While
Curry was in this condition, the police taperecorded his confession.
At his trial for first degree murder in 1960, the prosecution introduced
the tape recording into evidence without objection from Curry's attorney, who, on the contrary, stated, "I want them [the jury] to hear it."1
Defense counsel then argued that the tapes showed Curry was so befuddled and confused from intoxication that he could not have had the
"intent necessary to sustain a conviction of first degree or second degree
murder or of voluntary manslaughter."'2 Curry was thereafter convicted of second degree murder. On appeal to the California Court
of Appeal,' counsel claimed that Curry had been denied due process
because he was convicted on the basis of an involuntary confession.
In the course of the appellate court's ruling on the merits of this constitutional claim, in which the emphasis of the court was on the issue of
coercion, the court additionally stated that intoxication affected only
the weight the confession might be accorded by the jury and not its admissibility.4 Curry later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the
federal district court,5 which held that even if Curry had had a valid
constitutional objection to the introduction of his confession at the
trial, it was now precluded from consideration because his attorney had
deliberately bypassed California's procedural rule for raising such an
7
objection." The district court's holding was based on Fay v. Noia,
wherein the Supreme Court had stated:
*

Member, Second Year Class.

1. Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir. 1968).
2. Id.
3. People v. Curry, 192 Cal. App. 2d 664, 13 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1961).
4. Id. at 670, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
5. Curry v. Wilson, Civil No. 44066 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 28, 1966).
6. Crry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 111 (9th Cir. 1968). A state appellate
court will not rule upon the admissibility of evidence which was received in the trial
court without objection. Perry v. McLaughlin, 212 Cal. 1, 6, 297 P. 554, 557 (1931);
In re Chapman's Estate, 198 Cal. 145, 148, 243 P. 675, 676 (1926); Western Pipe &
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[T]he federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to
an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure
of the state
courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court
8
remedies.
Curry did not appeal this decision, but later repetitioned the same federal district court on identical grounds.9 The court refused to consider
the claim because of its prior denial of the writ. Cases decided after
Curry's trial and appeal, however, had made it increasingly clear
that extreme intoxication would have been a sufficient basis for exclusion of the taped confession at the trial.' 0 In consequence thereof,
Curry appealed the district court's denial to the Ninth Circuit claiming
that his trial counsel "may well not have been aware, in 1960, of the
relevance of Curry's intoxication to the voluntariness of his statements."'" It is the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the district court's
decision that comprises the topic of discussion for the remainder of
12
this Note.
Deliberate Bypass v. Waiver: A Distinction Without A Difference
The Ninth Circuit in Curry observed that the deliberate bypass
rule can, in an appropriate case, be a proper ground for denial of a
writ of habeas corpus.' 3 It pointed out, however, that in this case the
California Court of Appeal, by ruling on the merits of the constitutional
claim,' 4 had failed to enforce California's procedural rule which requires that for any issue of the admissibility of evidence to be considered on appeal, an objection thereto must be raised at the trial.' 5
Because the California court had failed to enforce its own procedural
rule, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the deliberate bypass rule was
inapplicable to Curry's petition for habeas corpus. It cited as authority
for this position Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,' 6 wherein
Steel Co. v. Tuolomne Gold Dredging Corp., 63 Cal. App. 2d 21, 26, 146 P.2d 61, 64

(1944).
7. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8. Id. at 438.
9. Curry v.Wilson, 269 F.Supp. 9 (N.D.Cal. 1967).
10. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), where the court held it
was a deprivation of constitutional rights to admit a confession adduced by police
questioning while petitioner's will was overborne by a drug having the properties of a
truth serum. In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), the court held that a confession

given while petitioner was sick and faint from lack of food and persistent interrogation
was unconstitutionally coerced.
11. Opening Brief for Appellant at 25, Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110 (9th
Cir. 1968).
12. Curry v.Wilson, 405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1968).
13. Id. at 111.
14. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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the Supreme Court stated:
The deliberate by-pass rule is applicable only "to an applicant
who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state
courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies"
17

In Hayden, when the Court used the term "forfeited," it was describing
a defendant who, in fact, was unable to obtain a state appellate ruling
on his claim. Consequently, any defendant who was able to obtain a
ruling on the merits, notwithstanding the procedural impropriety,
would not have forfeited his state court remedies.
Even though it had disposed of the deliberate bypass rule, the
Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, was still unwilling to rule on the voluntariness of Curry's confession. The court was certain that the trial
attorney would not have excluded the confession even if he could have
done so because the tapes, as circumstantial evidence of Curry's mental state during the shooting, were the only real defense that Curry
had. 8 Counsel, by relying heavily on that defense, had defeated at
least the first degree murder charge. The court therefore stated:
What counsel did was not a mere by-passing of a contemporaneous objection rule. It was an affirmative decision to waive the
objections
19 that he might have raised. That waiver is binding on
Curry.
This holding reaches the anomalous result that although the deliberate bypass rule did not preclude the consideration of the question of the voluntariness of the confession, the theory of waiver did.
The clear implication of this argument is that waiver and bypass are
two different things and, as such, may be independent grounds for a
denial of relief.
This distinction between waiver and bypass, however, is incon20
sistent with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia,
the case establishing the deliberate bypass rule:
We . . .hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.
But we wish to make very clear that this grant of discretion
is not to be interpreted as a permission to introduce legal fictions
into federal habeas corpus. The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst . . .-__an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege"--furnishes the
17.
supplied
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 297 n.3, quoting Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)
by the Court).
Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 113 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 112.
Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

(emphasis
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This juxtaposition of the terms "waiver" and "bypass" indicates that
the Supreme Court regarded bypass and waiver as identical concepts.
Moreover, the federal courts in decisions subsequent to Fay v. Noia
apparently have made no distinction between the two terms in cases
similar to Curry. In such cases, where the supposed waiver has been
manifested only by a failure to raise the constitutional claim at the2
proper time, the federal courts have used the terms interchangeably.
It is apparent from the Supreme Court opinion in Fay v. Noia
that the Ninth Circuit has introduced a distinction between the concepts
of waiver and deliberate bypass where none exists. Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit in Curry was unable to cite any persuasive authority to
justify the distinction. The two cases cited by the court as ostensibly
supporting its holding 23 were clearly and most
persuasively distinguished
24
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Browning.
21. Id. at 438-39. The Court continued: "If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the
privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate
by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny
him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the meritsthough of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing
or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default. Id. at 439.
22. In Pope v. Swenson, 395 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1968), trial counsel failed to
file a pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence and also failed to object to its
admission at the trial. The facts clearly showed that counsel intentionally relinquished
the right to exclude the tainted evidence because he felt he could make good use of
it on the behalf of his client. This relinquishment ultimately was held binding on
petitioner under the circumstances. Yet, in referring to counsel's deliberate failure to
act and petitioner's acquiescence in this strategy the court stated: "[T]he question
[is] whether there was a deliberate by-pass by petitioner of his right to have illegally
seized evidence excluded from consideration at his trial. Unless the record is clear
as to such waiver, there must also be an evidentiary hearing on this issue." Id. at 323
(emphasis added). Clearly the Eighth Circuit in Pope was not distinguishing the two
terms. Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1967), is a similar example where
an arguably involuntary statement was admitted into evidence without objection by
trial counsel. The facts showed that trial counsel's strategy was to have the statements admitted and to relinquish the right to exclude them. The court stated: "We
think this a case of 'deliberate by-passing by counsel of the contemporaneous objection
rule as a part of trial strategy' which bars subsequent assertion of the federal
ground ...
"Entirely aside from waiver, we think the statement . . . was voluntary." Id. at
665-66 (emphasis added). The clear indication here is that the Fourth Circuit also
makes no distinction between bypass and waiver.
23. Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966); Nelson v. California,
346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965).
24. 405 F.2d at 114, 116 n.3. Judge Browning points out that these cases
purport to deal only with bypass. The decisions-Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20
(9th Cir. 1966); Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965)-suggest that
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It seems upon a close reading of Curry that an impelling motive
for the court's attempt to distinguish between waiver and deliberate
bypass was that Curry's defense counsel had based what the court
considered his most effective argument on the evidence later objected
to. The irrelevance of this factor, however, can be seen from an
examination of the very case upon which the Ninth Circuit relied in
finding the deliberate bypass rule inapplicable: Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden.2 5 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
although the evidence clearly showed a deliberate bypass by defendant's trial counsel, the deliberate bypass rule was inapplicable for substantially the same reasons as in Curry. At no time did the Court

suggest that conduct by trial counsel, which proved that there was, in
fact, a deliberate bypass, could prove something more, and thereby
provide the basis for finding a waiver of the right to object to inadmissible evidence even though the bypass rule was inapplicable on technical procedural grounds.2 6
This problem is not likely to occur frequently.2 7 It arises only
where the state appellate court fails to enforce its own procedural rule.
the Ninth Circuit feels that the bypass rule is actually two rules in one. First is a
"mere bypass" rule which might be characterized as a procedural rule very similar
to the adequate state ground doctrine. That is, where there is a state procedure
open to the defendant, the Ninth Circuit would apparently deny habeas corpus, even
in the absence of any intentional bypass. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 82
(9th Cir. 1965); Kuhl v. United-States, 370 F.2d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1966). Second is
the "deliberate bypass" rule which the Ninth Circuit seems to agree is a rule of
waiver affecting the underlying constitutional right. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.
2d 73, 82 (9th Cir. 1965). The Ninth Circuit evidently regards Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), as affecting only the applicability of the socalled "mere bypass" rule. See text accompanying note 19 supra. However, the
Supreme Court in Fay v. Nola did not lay down a "mere bypass" rule but rather a
deliberate bypass rule. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). A mere bypass is no grounds for a deniel of relief on federal habeas corpus at all. As is aptly
pointed out by Judge Browning, "Deliberate bypass included bypass for strategic or
tactical reasons . . . and thus includes the kind of affirmative decision which the
majority attempts to distinguish from a 'mere' bypass." 405 F.2d at 116 n.4. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia went to great lengths to explain that the
adequate state ground doctrine is not applicable to federal habeas corpus. The
discussion in Fay v. Noia leaves no doubt that the Ninth Circuit's "mere bypass"
rule would be disapproved for the same reasons as was the adequate state ground
doctrine. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99, 426-34 (1963).
25. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
26. See id. at 297 n.3.
27. The only cases which have involved the possibility of waiver upon a holding that the bypass rule is inapplicable are Hayden and Curry. Nelson v. California;
346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), discussed in note 24 supra, really did not involve this
issue because the Ninth Circuit held that the by-pass rule was applicable, even
though the state court had not enforced its procedural rules. Nelson, however, was
apparently overruled on this point by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387,U.S.
294, 297 n.3 (1967).
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Nevertheless, since cases do arise which require holding the bypass rule
inapplicable on this ground, there must be a clear understanding of
the import of the Ninth Circuit's approach to Curry. If bypass and
waiver are the same, justice is not served by enforcing the latter when
the former is inapplicable. If there is a valid distinction between the
two terms-though logic seems to belie any such possibility-then justice demands that it be defined and clarified, especially since the United
States Supreme Court has delineated no such distinction. The Ninth
Circuit in Curry, however, makes no satisfactory attempt to give substance to the purported distinction it makes.
Waiver of An Unknown Right
Even assuming arguendo that the Ninth Circuit was justified in
making a distinction between deliberate bypass and waiver, it seems that
the refusal of the court to hear the issue of the voluntariness of Curry's
confession was nevertheless in error.
At the time of his trial in 1960, the California rule was that mere
intoxication did not deprive a confession of its voluntariness; it went
only to the weight the confession should be given by the jury.28 Although Curry's counsel might have deduced from the existing federal cases that extreme intoxication would, in the future, be held a
sufficient basis for a claim of involuntariness,2 9 the major development
of the intoxication issue in the federal courts came after Curry's trial. 30
3
The culmination was the Ninth Circuit case of Gladden v. Unsworth, '
where it was held that a
conviction, predicated in part on testimony describing incriminating oral statements made by [the accused] while he was in a
state of gross intoxication, carries with it such a potential for invasion of constitutional rights
that it [could] not stand unless vindi32
cated by further inquiry.
Curry argued in the Ninth Circuit proceeding that in 1960 it
had not been clear that his intoxication rendered the confession involuntary. Since a knowing waiver necessarily depends upon knowledge, trial counsel could not have waived the involuntariness claim. The
court replied with the argument that trial counsel obviously wanted the
jury to hear the tapes, and that
[t]he trial record makes counsel's strategy so clear that to hold a
28.

See People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 211,

266 P.2d 505, 511

(1954);

People v. Dorman, 28 Cal. 2d 846, 854, 172 P.2d 686, 691 (1946).
29. E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954).
30.

See note 10 supra.

31.

396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968).

32.

Id. at 381.
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hearing on the question of what his strategy was would be an exercise in futility. 33
Since "waiver ordinarily is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege,"3 4 the Ninth Circuit's holding is open to only two possible interpretations: (1) that counsel did
in fact know, or should have known, the confession was excludable,
or (2) that it is irrelevant whether counsel knew the confession was
excludable because his trial strategy shows he would not have objected
even if he had known.
The recent case of Smith v. Yeager35 has ruled out the possibility
of a presumption that counsel did in fact know the confession was excludable. That case involved a 1961 petition for federal habeas corpus
by a state prisoner. Petitioner's attorney told the federal district couit
that he thought his client was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
constitutional claims, but stated he did not think it was necessary. 6
Later, when the case of Townsend v. Sain37 expanded the right of
federal habeas corpus applicants to evidentiary hearings, the petitioner
reapplied. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held:
Whatever counsel's reasons for this obscure gesture of noblesse
oblige, we cannot now examine the state of his mind, or presume
that he intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege . . .
was of doubtful existence at the time of
when the right or privilege
38
the supposed waiver.
Likewise, it can be shown that courts are not free to say that
counsel should have known of the right which he presumably waived.
Even though a subsequent case changes the law only infinitesimally,
counsel is not held to "Delphic anticipation '3 9 of its effect on his cases.
The Fifth Circuit case of Doby v. Beto4 ° is a good example. At the time
of Doby's trial, there was no case in point, but guidelines existed by which
defense counsel could have deduced that the search warrant in his case
would have been held invalidly issued because it was based upon a constitutionally insufficient affidavit. Counsel, however, failed to object to
the warrant. The affidavit in Doby recited:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other
narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above
described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the
405 F.2d at 113 n.2.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
35. 393 U.S. 122 (1968).
36. Id. at 123.
37. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
38. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 126 (1968).
39. United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Pa.
1968), afl'd, 406 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1969).
40. 371 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1967).
33.
34.
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provisions of the law. 41
The law at the time of the trial had been expressed in Ker v. California,4 2 in which the Supreme Court had stated:
[The Fourth] Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. [T]he standard of
reasonableness [with respect to searches and seizures] is the same
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. .... 43
The Court in Giordenello v. United States,4" when considering a similar
affidavit, stated:
[T]he inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint "[must]
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime".

. The commissioner must judge for him-

. .

self the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. He should not accept without
question the complainant's mere conclusion. .... 45
It is certainly arguable that from these cases Doby's counsel could
have deduced that the affidavit was constitutionally insufficient since
it contained no indication of personal knowledge. And subsequent to
Doby, in Aguilar v. Texas, 40 the Supreme Court held an affidavit iden47
tical to the one in Doby insufficient for precisely the same reason.
Notwithstanding all these indicia, the Fifth Circuit stated in Doby:
"Appellant and his counsel

.

.

.

cannot be charged with failure to an-

ticipate the Aguilar decision. 4 8
The basis for the Doby decision was the Supreme Court decision of O'Connor v. Ohio,49 in which it was held that counsel's failure
to object to a practice which Ohio had long allowed could not strip a
petitioner of his right to attack that practice following its invalidation
by the Supreme Court.5" O'Connor coupled with Doby might very
well indicate that a holding similar to that in Doby is necessary in cases
like Curry where subsequent decisions of the courts either retroactively
or prospectively have the effect of creating new rights or broadening
those already established. These decisions make it clear, therefore,
that although counsel might have been able to anticipate the subsequent
decision and on the basis of it make an argument beforehand on behalf
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48
49.
50.

Id. at 111 n.1.
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
Id. at 33.
357 U.S. 480 (1958).
Id. at 486.
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Id. at 114.
Doby v. Beto, 371 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1967).
385 U.S. 92 (1966).
Id. at 93.
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of his client, the courts will not insist that he do so.5 '
Attention is now focused on the final possible interpretation of the
court's holding in Curry-the rationalization that somehow counsel's
trial strategy transcends the fact that the right was unknown. This
statement has an appealing sound, but if true, it asserts that the court
feels competent to predict what counsel would have done had the right
been known.
The Fourth Circuit in Ledbetter v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,5 2 was also faced with this problem, but rejected the Ninth Circuit's rationalization. Like Curry, Ledbetter involved not only the
failure of trial counsel to object to the admission of a confession, but
additionally his election to use the confession as the basis for a defense
argument. The court ruled that at the time of the trial there was no
basis upon which a trial attorney could reasonably have objected.5"
Counsel's strategy may have been quite clear because of the active use
he made of the confession, yet the court stated:
[T]he waiver principle delineated in Fay v. Noia . . . is
inapplicable where, as here, there existed no known ground on
which the trial attorney could have based an objection at trial.
In the context of this case there was . . .no "strategic choice"
to be made, and none can be supplied by the fact that when the
have
confession was admitted in evidence-as it inevitably would
54
been in 1960-the lawyer made an argument based on it.
Keeping in mind the standard set down in Johnson v. Zerbst,5 5 that
"'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights," 56 clearly, the reasoning of the Ledbetter
decision is sounder and more persuasive than the Ninth Circuit's. It
is only natural that a trial attorney will try to make the best of any
evidence against his client. The fact that he does so does not mean
that he would not object to the evidence if he thought it were excludable. The courts, therefore, should not be allowed to base their decisions on their speculation of what defense strategy would have been
had the facts been different.
Thus, the decision in Curry is subject to attack on two grounds.
After finding that Curry's constitutional claim could not be barred by
51. It is important here to distinguish the question of waiver from the question
whether a case is applied retroactively. In Ledbetter v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary,
368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966), the court discussed these two questions independently,
recognizing that where rights are delineated in decisions subsequent to the petitioner's
trial there must be a finding of both nonwaiver and retroactive application of the
decision. The discussion here concerns only the question of waiver.
52. 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 494.
54. Id.
55. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
56. Id. at 464.
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the bypass rule, it was only by an unjustifiable exercise of semantic hairsplitting that the Ninth Circuit nevertheless barred the claim by labelling
the same conduct a waiver. In any event, since it is doubtful whether
the confession could have been excluded at Curry's trial in 1960, it is
apparent that counsel could not have waived an unknown right. Because of the uncertainty created by Curry, the Ninth Circuit should reconsider whether it believes any real substantive distinction between
waiver and bypass to exist. Furthermore, since it is clear in the abstract
that unknown rights cannot be waived, the Ninth Circuit is encouraged
to clarify its position on waiver based on counsel's trial strategy. If
defense counsel's strategy can somehow transcend the dictates of
Johnson v. Zerbst,57 then clearly some delineation is in order.
Robert R. Millsap, Jr.*

H.

Waiver of Right to Counsel-Hodge v. United States,
414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969).

In recent years, the sixth amendment right to counsel has been
vastly expanded.' In light of the judicial recognition of the crucial importance of this right, any attempt to waive counsel should be viewed
with great suspicion. In Hodge v. United States,2 however, the Ninth
Circuit took a step in the opposite direction by limiting the extent to
which the validity of a waiver of counsel must be rigorously investigated.
In the Hodge case, the defendant was charged with and con3
victed of transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in foreign commerce.
At the time of the trial, Hodge's court-appointed counsel made a motion
to be relieved, explaining to the court that because of a "difference of
opinion," Hodge had decided to represent himself. 4 While addressing
the Court, Hodge stated that "because of a witness or two that's supposed to appear against me . . . [I] feel that I have a better chance
• . . than an attorney that don't know the circumstances of the witnesses. ' 'a The court acceded to Hodge's request to represent himself,
but warned him that he would be at a "distinct disadvantage" in acting
57.

*

304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Member, Second Year Class.

1. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2. 414 F.2d 1040 (1969).
3. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
4 414 F.2d at 1042 n.3.
5. Id.
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as his own attorney. 6 The court-appointed counsel was relieved from
all further responsibility other than remaining in attendance during the
trial to aid in procedural matters. 7 Hodge was convicted. 8
In 1968, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the appellant's conviction0 and pronounced what appeared to be new and more stringent
requirements for a valid waiver of counsel. 10 The court concluded that
the appellant did not "intelligently," and "with eyes open," waive his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel." The court further indicated that in certain circumstances, prior consultation between an attorney and the defendant may be2 necessary before a finding of a valid
waiver of counsel can be made.'
In 1969, the case was reheard by the Ninth Circuit and the court,
sitting en banc, rejected the stringent requirements for a valid waiver
of counsel established in the earlier Hodge decision,' 3 and held that a
waiver of counsel was intelligently made and therefore valid, if the accused was "sufficiently informed of the consequences of his choice."' 4
The test was met, according to the majority, if
the defendant understood the charges against him and was
fully aware of the fact that he would be on his own in a complex
area where experience and professional training are greatly to be
desired. 15
Using this test, the court found that Hodge's waiver was valid and affirmed his conviction.
In deciding the issue of waiver before trial, the court relied upon
the vague requirement established by the 1938 Supreme Court decision
in Johnson v. Zerbst'G that a waiver of counsel to be valid must be "intelligent and competent. ' ' r "Whether there is a proper waiver," said the
Supreme Court, "should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it
would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1041.
9. Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
10. 20 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1969).
11. Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517 at 9 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
12. "Moreover, insofar as it may be practicable to do so, by the appointment of
counsel for a limited purpose or otherwise, the court must satisfy itself that the accused,
in order to appreciate the risk, possesses reasonable understanding of the bare elements
of the offense and choices of pleas and defenses which might be available."

(emphasis added).
13.
14.

Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (1969).
Id. at 1042.

15. Id. at 1043.
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Id. at 465.

Id. at 8
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the record."1 8 This vague "intelligent and competent" guideline, however, left many questions unanswered. For eight years, it was unclear
whether there existed any specific duty on the part of the trial judge to
inform the defendant of his right to counsel in order to find a valid
waiver of that right.' 9 In 1946, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure settled the question by requiring that the trial court advise the defendant of his right to counsel and assign counsel if the defendant desired but could not afford one.2 °
In 1948, the Supreme Court decided Von Moltke v. Gillies,2 ' a
case in which the defendant had waived his right to counsel before
entering a guilty plea. The Court, recognizing the strong presumption
against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, outlined a more
stringent standard for testing the validity of a waiver than the "intelligent and competent" standard previously established in Johnson:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole
matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed
waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from
of all the circuma penetrating and comprehensive examination
22
stances under which such a plea is tendered.
The Von Moltke guidelines have been given varying interpretations. Although some courts appear to have adopted them as the proper procedure
for testing the validity of all waivers of counsel, 23 the Ninth Circuit, on
18. Id.
19. Compare DeJordan v. Hunter, 145 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 853 (1945), and Lewis v. Johnston, 112 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1940), with
O'Keith v. Johnston, 146 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873
(1945), Harpin v. Johnston, 109 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 624
(1940), and Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 308 U.S.
553 (1939).
20. The 1946 version read as follows: "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without
counsel or is able to obtain counsel." Fed. R. Crim. P. 44, 327 U.S. 866 (1945). As
amended July 1, 1966, Rule 44 now reads: "Every defendant who is unable to obtain
counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the
proceeding from his initial appearance before the commissioner . . . unless he waives
such appointment."
21. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
22. Id. at 724.
23. See United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968);
Cranford v. Rodrignez, 373 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1967); Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909
(10th Cir. 1965). It should be noted, however, that although the language in these
cases seems to indicate that the Von Moltke guidelines should be used even if the defendant does not intend to plead guilty, all the cases did involve guilty pleas.
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rehearing, refused to adhere to the clear directions embodied in Von
MoItke and ruled that the Von MoItke requirements were applicable
only where a waiver of counsel was made contemporaneously with a
plea of guilty. 24 According to the majority, "[s]uch a colloquy has no
place in a case where guilt is denied and an offer of counsel is rejected." 28 The court further indicated that to apply the Von Moltke
requirements in a case where the waiver is followed by an innocent plea
"would seem to subject the defendant to a questionable pretrial probing
20
of his defenses."
The Ninth Circuit's discussion is open to criticism on several
grounds. First, the court reasoned that the Von Moltke requirements
are applicable only to those waivers made contemporaneously with
guilty pleas; yet, the Von Moltke directions do not make an explicit
distinction between waivers of counsel generally and waivers of counsel
made contemporaneously with guilty pleas. In any event, the Ninth
Circuit's narrow construction of Von Moltke would seem to conflict
with the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision. As one writer has
pointed out:
[A]t a criminal trial the validity of a waiver of counsel is a preliminary issue which must be determined at the time of an alleged
waiver on the basis of the evidence existing at that time. Thus,
whether the defendant pleads guilty or presents a valid defense 27is
of no significance to the decision as to the validity of the waiver.
Second, as the dissent points out, even though a strict adherence to the
Von Moltke directions may result in the exposure of possible defenses
and other matters about which the accused might properly remain silent
during trial, this information would be 2totally
excluded from the ulti8
mate determination of guilt or innocence.
The analogous problem of the acceptance of guilty pleas and its
treatment by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides another
strong argument in favor of the view that use of the Von Moltke guidelines should not be limited to cases where the defendant intends to plead
guilty. Rule 11 states in part that
[tihe court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such plea . . .without first addressing the defendant per24. 414 F.2d at 1044.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 20 HAsnNGS L.J. 965, 971 (1969).
28. 414 F.2d at 1050. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
where the Supreme Court held that in order to protect his fifth amendment rights,
certain pretrial testimony given by defendant in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds could not thereafter be admitted against him at
trial on the issue of guilt unless he made no objection. Objectionable information
which might be elicited from a defendant while protecting his sixth amendment right
would likewise most probably be excluded.
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sonally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of
29
the plea.
In a recent decision, McCarthy v. United States,3" the Supreme Court
ruled that failure to follow Rule 11 automatically entitles the defendant
to a new trial, regardless of whether the record shows prejudice:
[P]rejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule 11, for noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's procedural safeguards, which are designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea.

Our holding . . . not

only will insure that every accused is afforded those procedural
safeguards, but will also help reduce the great waste of judicial
resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea
convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose
of, when the original record is inadequate. 31
By requiring strict compliance with Rule 11, the Supreme Court
sought to safeguard the rights of defendants and to reduce the number
of appeals encouraged by inadequate trial records. These objectives
would be equally advanced by requiring that the Von Moltke guidelines
be used in all cases where the defendant attempts to waive his right to
counsel. Such a standardized procedure, taking only a few moments of
the court's time, would discourage frivolous appeals and insure that
only those waivers made with "eyes wide open" would be accepted.
Moreover, it seems that "the crucial rights of one insisting upon his innocence" should be given protections equal to those afforded "the
rights of one who seeks to confess a crime by a plea of guilty." 2 It
has been suggested that perhaps even "greater safeguards should be
placed on a waiver of counsel than on a guilty plea since a guilty plea
has the additional safeguard that the court is not bound to accept it." 33
It is unfortunate that the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, was not
pursuaded by the logic of its former holding. The Von Moltke guidelines are equally appropriate where the defendant intends to waive
counsel and plead innocent. By following them and patterning its
procedure after that required by Rule 11, the trial court could, by
appropriate inquiries, simply and clearly establish in the record that the
defendant's waiver of counsel was really an intelligent and understanding one.
Hodge's second contention was that even assuming he had waived
his right to counsel at trial, he was nevertheless entitled to be repre29.
30.
31.
32.
opinion).
33.

CRiM. P. 11.
394 U.S. 459 (1969).
Id. at 471-72.
Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1054 n.5 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
FED. R.

20 HAsTINGs L.J. 971-72 (1969).
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sented by counsel at the time of sentencing.3 4 The majority opinion
rather abruptly dismissed this contention, stating that "[i]n the absence of any indication to the contrary . . . the court was entitled to
assume that the waiver was still in effect."3 5 The court further reasoned
that since advisory counsel was present and available if the defendant
wanted advice, the appellant's "failure to utilize him, with full knowledge of his right to do so, amounted to waiver."3 6
The dissent argued that such an assumption is generally unsuperroneous when dealing with the facts involved in
portable and clearly
7
the Hodge case.
It was not until two years after Hodge was sentenced that the Supreme Court first held that the sixth amendment conferred the right to
counsel at the time of sentencing. In Mempa v. Rhay88 the Court stated
that "the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances, and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent."3 9
This holding was later given retroactive effect by the decision in McConnell v. Rhay.4 0
An examination of the record reveals that not only did the court
fail to advise Hodge of his right to counsel during the sentencing proceedings, but it also failed to explain the importance of utilizing counsel
at that crucial stage of the proceedings. 41 Because Hodge neither knew
of his right to counsel during sentencing, nor of the importance of that
right, it is difficult to see how the majority could assume that there was
an intelligent waiver of that right. "To engage in such an assumption
is to nullify the strong opposing presumption which the Supreme Court
has consistently directed [the courts] to apply when considering an
issue involving the claimed waiver of significant constitutional rights."4
The right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings is a fundamental constitutional right. In waiving that right,
an accused seriously prejudices his chances of presenting a competent
defense. In order to safeguard an accused's right to counsel and reduce the number of frivolous appeals encouraged by inadequate trial
records, the trial judge should be required to make every attempt to
establish in the record that the accused was sufficiently knowledgeable
34. 414 F.2d at 1044.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1045-47.
38. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
39. Id. at 135.
40. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
41. 414 F.2d at 1046 (dissenting opinion).
42. Id.
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of his fundamental right and of the gravity of the risk that he would
encounter by its waiver. By applying the Von Moltke guidelines in a
manner similar to the simple procedure of Rule 11, a trial judge can
extend to the criminal defendant the opportunity to enjoy the full protection of the sixth amendment and at the same time be sure that the
validity of any waiver by the defendant of that protection will be
clearly established in the record. The Ninth Circuit's failure to require
this approach is at odds, not only with current constitutional doctrine,
43
but also with the efficient administration of criminal justice.
Kenneth N. Schlossberg*

I.

Denial of Probation-Whitfield v. United States,
401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968).

In Whitfield v. United States' the defendant was convicted on two
counts of federal income tax evasion. She was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. Her
request for probation was denied and she appealed from the judgment
of conviction, contending that the government's evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that she was not advised of her right
to counsel when she was interviewed by an agent of the Internal Revenue
Service. The Ninth Circuit rejected both of these allegations and affirmed the conviction.2 It is important to note that Mrs. Whitfield did
not raise the issue of denial of probation in her first appeal to the Ninth
Circuit. However, on the day the Ninth Circuit's mandate issued,
she filed in the district court a motion, purportedly under Rule
35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to correct or reduce
the sentence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.' After stating that "there are expressions in past decisions of
this court indicating that an appeal will not lie from the denial of probation 4 and that the denial of probation issue should have been raised
on the defendant's first appeal, the Ninth Circuit "elect[ed] to disregard these possible barriers to a determination of the probation issue on
43. Although the dissent is clearly the preferred position, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hodge unfortunately will not be heard because a petition for writ of certiorari
was never filed.
* Member, Second Year Class.
1.
2.
3.
4.

401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
Whitfield v. United States, 383 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967).
Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 482.

March 19701

CRIMNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

the merits!"5 and again affirmed the decision of the district court.
In this second appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Mrs. Whitfield attacked
her denial of probation alleging that it was unlawful because her sentence was imposed by the court under the erroneous and illegal assumption of law that the defendant who pleads not guilty is not as entitled to
probation as one who pleads guilty.6 Further, she contended "that probation was denied not only because she had pleaded not guilty, but also
because, after conviction, she would not admit guilt, nor waive her
right to appeal from the judgment of conviction."' 7 The Ninth Circuit
held that two of these three allegations were without merit: "[P]robation was [not] denied [to] Mrs. Whitfield because she pleaded not
guilty or because she did not waive her right to appeal the judgment of
conviction." 8 However, after stating that appellate review of denial of
probation is strictly limited to determining whether or not there was an
abuse of discretion by the district judge,9 the court went on to say:
At least where an admission of guilt cannot jeopardize a prospective appeal . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for a district
judge to deny probation to a person who, after conviction, will
not admit wrongdoing.' 0
The district judge, at the hearing for the defendant's Rule 35 motion, stated that a person who refused to admit his guilt after conviction
could not be rehabilitated. In the judge's mind, apparently, rehabilitation was the only purpose served by probation; hence, he denied defendant's motion." The Ninth Circuit expressly approved the reasoning of
the district judge, 12 without examining either its logic or its possible
implications.
With this cursory summary of the Whitfield case in mind, this Note
will examine the following salient characteristics and implications of the
case: first, the scope and purpose of the Federal Probation Act; second,
the standards to be applied in determining whether to grant or deny
the defendant probation; and third, the extent of federal appellate review of decisions of the district courts in denying probation.
5. Id.
6. Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1968).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 482.
9. Id.
10. Id. at-483 (emphasis added).
11. "[Wjhere she doesn't admit she ever did anything wrong, there isn't anything to rehabilitate, so there isn't anything [the probation officer] can do and, further,
probation has to be based upon trust and confidence and if she won't tell the truth to
the probation officer or to the court, then there's no basis for probation." Id. at
482 n.3.
12. Id. at 482-83.
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The Scope and Purposes of the Federal Probation Act
The Federal Probation Act was enacted in 192513 in response to a
Supreme Court decision 4 denying the federal district courts the power
to grant probation to, or suspend the sentences of, those convicted of
crimes in the federal courts. The Court in that decision held the past
practice of many of the district courts of granting probation and suspending the execution or imposition of sentences unconstitutional. If
a system of probation was to be established in the federal courts it was
a matter requiring congressional action, not judicial fiat.
The Probation Act authorizes the federal trial court to "suspend
the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation" when the court is "satisfied that the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby."' 5
The Act further provides that "such terms and conditions as the court
deems best" may be imposed by the trial judge in granting probation
and that he "may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may
change the period of probation."' 6 From the above, it is apparent that
the scope of the Act is very broad; the power of the court to grant or
deny probation is restricted only by the single legislative mandate that
probation cannot be granted where the offense involved is "punishable
'
by death or life imprisonment." "
The widescale discretionary powers granted to the federal trial
courts by the Probation Act reflect the
prevalent modem philosophy of penology that the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime. .

.

. The belief

no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls
for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender. .

.

. Retribution is no longer the

dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.'8
13. Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§
3651-56 (1964).
14. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). For the congressional history
of the Probation Act, see United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
16. Id.
17. Id. "[T]he Congress has given the courts virtually a blank check in carrying out the sentencing function ...... Bennett, Individualizing the Sentencing Function, 27 F.R.D. 359 (1961).
18. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (citations omitted).
As stated in Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968): "Probation is
intended to be a means of restoring to society offenders who are good social risks; to
afford the unfortunate another opportunity by clemency ....
It is designed to
aid the rehabilitation of a 'penitent offender'; to take advantage of an opportunity for
'reformation' which active service of the suspended sentence might make less probable." Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
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The purposes of probation are many. The one most often enunciated in legal literature is rehabilitation or reformation of the offender.19
This, apparently, was the only objective considered by the district judge
in denying probation in Whitfield.2" In addition to rehabilitation, the
following important objectives are also served by probation: (1) It
fosters a penal system which tailors the punishment to fit the individual
instead of the crime, 2 1 and humanizes the law22 by taking into account
the individual's personality and personal characteristics, including his
recidivist tendencies if any. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
The device of probation grew out of a realization that to make
the punishment fit the criminal requires wisdom seldom available
immediately after conviction. Imposition of sentence at that time
is much too often an obligation to exercise caprice, and to make
convicted persons serve such a sentence is apt to make law a
collaborator in new anti-social consequences. . . . Thus the probation system is in effect a reliance23on the future to reveal treatment appropriate to the probationer.
(2) The indelible taint of being an ex-convict, and the hardships appurtenant thereto, does not stain the reputation of one who has been granted
probation. 24 This no doubt gives the probationer a psychological
advantage over the person committed to prison in his efforts to conform
to the laws and mores of the society. Correspondingly, the probationer
is not exposed to and unfavorably influenced by the "hardened criminals" confined in our nation's prisons. (3) The probation system provides a substantial financial savings to the taxpayer for the cost of providing for a criminal offender in a correctional institution is many
times greater than the cost of administering a program of probation for
him. 25 Also, while on probation the offender will be gainfully em19. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Berman v.
United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937); Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480,
482-83 (9th Cir. 1968).
20. See note 11 supra.
21. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see Pennsylvania v. Ashe,
302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
22. "[R~ehabilitation and reformation are not primary or exclusive goals [of
probation and parole]; indeed, the term humanitarianism is probably more descriptive
of the best of what corrections does under the label of rehabilitation." F. COHEN,
THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS:

IMPLICATIONS

FOR MANPOWER

AND TRAIN-

ING 31 (1969) (prepared for the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and
Training) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
23. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 263, 273 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
24. See United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928), where the Court said
that probation is "an amelioration of the sentence . . . so that the stigma might be
withheld. . . before actual imprisonment should stain the life of the convict." Id. at
357.
25. See Van Dusen, Trends in Sentencing Since 1957 and Areas of Substantial
Agreement and Disagreement in Sentencing Principles, 35 F.R.D. 395, 399-400 (1964).
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ployed and able to support a family that might otherwise be the recipients of government welfare.2 6
Criteria Applied in Determining Whether to Grant or Deny Probation
The only judicial guideline set down by the Federal Probation Act
is that the court "may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation" when it is "satisfied that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant
will be served thereby ....
27 The probation rule, Rule 32(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides no guidelines whatever. 8 The remainder of the Probation Act deals with the mechanics
of administering the probation system.2 9 The only guideline in the
area of probation is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) which
provides:
(1) The probation service of the court shall make a presentence
investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation unless the court otherwise directs. The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant pleaded guilty or
has been found guilty.
(2) The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any
prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about
his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances
affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in
granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant,
and such other information as may be required by the Court.
But even Rule 32(c) does not establish any definite standards for the
court's use in determining whether or not it will grant probation; it
merely provides information for the court's consideration, "unless the
court otherwise directs." It grants the court the use of the probation
service as a factfinder and lists some factors that Congress thought
should be given consideration by the court.
The Model Penal Code 30 suggests a more comprehensive set of
26. The most common condition imposed by the judge in granting probation is
to "provide for the probationer's family." COHEN, supra note 22, at 31.
27.

18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964)

(emphasis added).

28. FED. R. CriM. P. 32(e) reads in full as follows: "After conviction of an
offense not punishable by death or by life imprisonment, the defendant may be
placed on probation as provided by law."
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3653-56 (1964).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides: "(1)
The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of
the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for protection of the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or

probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
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criteria to be considered by the trial court in probation proceedings, listing 11 "grounds [that] shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding
sentence of imprisonment. ' 31 In light of the difficulty involved in trying to apply a single standard to every case-indeed, the difficulty involved in even trying to formulate such a standard-such criteria are
extremely useful.
As summarized by District Judge William B. Herlands, the defendant should be granted probation "[i]f, in the court's informed judgment,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will remain at supervised liberty without violating the laws and that the defendant's continued presence in the community is not incompatible with public policy
and public safety . ... Judge Herlands, after stating that "[tihe
desiderata of a sentence are public protection, deterrence, and correction
of the offender" and that "[rietribution. . .has generally ceased to be
"2

(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c)a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
"(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the Court, shall
be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm;
(c)the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e)the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission
of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely
to recur;
(i)the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime;
(j)the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would enatil excessive hardshp to
himself or his dependents.
"(3) When a person who has been convicted of a crime is not sentenced to
imprisonment, the Court shall place him on probation if he is in need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that the probation service can provide."
31. Id. An even more comprehensive set of criteria, encompassing 26 "specific
factors that must be considered," is found in Herlands, When and How Should
Sentencing Judge Use Probation, 35 F.R.D. 487, 494-97 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Herlands]; see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 n.15 (1948).
32. Herlands, supra note 31, at 497,
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process," 33 further

a major function of the sentencing
says that
[p]robation, like any other form of sentence, expresses a judgment
in which the court has reconciled and balanced the following three
interests in light of the individual circumstances of the case:
(1) the paramount interest of protecting the public against
criminal acts by the defendant and others who may be potential
violators of the same laws;
(2) the interest of the public and the defendant in his rehabilitation in order that he may become or be restored as an asset
to himself, his family and the community; and
(3) the objective of achieving other ends of justice, such as,
vindicating and enforcing the public policy underlying the particular statute that was violated.
Obviously, the sentencing judge must make a qualitative
analysis of all of the factors in
8 4 each case in order to impose a sentence tailored to fit that case.
It is clear, then, that any standards applied in the determination of
the probation question are judicially self-imposed. More specifically,
because sentencing by a trial judge is seldom questioned by an appellate
court, 5 these standards will be determined by the trial judge himself.
And as probation proceedings in the federal district courts are not reported and seldom reviewed by the federal appellate courts, there is
little information available on the standards actually used. The cases
say only that the granting of probation is left to the discretion 3 G of the
trial judge and, absent an abuse of that discretion, his decision will not
be questioned.37
In Whitfield, the court repeated this doctrine:
Probation cannot be demanded as of right; it is a privilege which
may be granted or withheld within the discretion of the district
court. .

.

. It follows that if any appellate review of the denial

of probation is permissible,
the sole issue is whether there was an
88
abuse of discretion.
And, as was recently stated by another Ninth Circuit case, 9 the "only
33.

Id. at 492; see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1948).

34.

Herlands, supra note 31, at 493.

35. See 109 U. PA. L. REV. 422 (1961).
36. In speaking of judicial discretion generally, an early California case said:
"The discretion intended, however, is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, guided
and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion,
to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the
spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of
substantial justice." Bailey v. Taaffe, 29 Cal. 422 (1866).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Birnbaum, 402 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 914 (1969); Trueblood Longknife v. United States, 381 F.2d 17, 19

(9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 1960); Dodd v
United States, 213 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir. 1954).
38.

401 F.2d at 482.

39.

Trueblood Longknife v. United States, 381 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967).
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limit" on the district judge's exercise of discretion "is that he must be

satisfied that his action will subserve the ends of justice and the best
interests of both the public and the defendant." 40
In summary, probation is a question left solely to the discretion of
the trial judge and his decision will not be questioned unless the defendant clearly proves that the judge abused his discretion in denying probation.
What Constitutes Abuse of Discretion by the Trial Judge
Quite commonly an abuse of discretion is defined by the cases as an
arbitrary or capricious decision made by the trial judge. 4 1 Thus, if the
judge denies the defendant a hearing on the merits of his application for
probation 42 because, for example, of a policy of the court never to grant

probation to one who has pleaded not guilty and has gone to trial,4 a
there obviously has been an abuse of discretion.4 4 This was the holding
of the Seventh Circuit in Wiley v. United States,4 5 relied upon by the
defendant in Whitfield.40
In Wiley, the court held that the district judge's "standing policy

[not to] consider an application for probation by a defendant who
pleads not guilty and stands trial' ' 7 was in violation of the plain mean40. Id. at 20, restating Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932),
where the court was interpreting the Federal Probation Act, March 4, 1925, ch. 521,
43 Stat. 1259, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1964).
41. E.g., Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1966); see
Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932) ("whim or caprice"); Whitfield v.
United States, 401 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1968) ("arbitrary reason wholly unrelated
to the statutory standard"); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1960)
("arbitrarily"); Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1926) ("gross or
palpable abuse").
42. Such a denial has been held to be arbitrary. United States v. Wiley, 267
F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1959). See also People v. Hollis, 176 Cal. App. 2d 92, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1959); State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 289 P.2d 315 (1955); People v.
Donovan, 376 Ill. 602, 35 N.E.2d 54 (1941); Gillespie v. State, 355 P.2d 451 (Ct.
Crim. App. Okla. 1960).
43. Such a policy has been held to be an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959). See also People v. Jones, 87 Cal. App. 482,
262 P. 361 (1927); Gillespie v. State, 355 P.2d 451 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1960);
S. RunN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION § 10, at 190 (1963).
44. See cases cited in notes 42 & 43 supra.
45. 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
46. Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968).
47. Wiley v. United States, 267 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1959). "Only the most
ni ive can believe that a significant number of these guilty pleas result from pangs
of conscience, indicate the first step toward repentance, or show a willingness to
assume responsibility for one's conduct. Guilty pleas, by and large, are the result of
bargaining sessions where the plea is offered in return for charging and sentencing
concessions. Indeed, many more criminal cases are 'tried'--and 'convictions' and

1016

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

ing of the Federal Probation Act. The case was remanded to the district court "for consideration of the defendant's application of probation,"4 the Seventh Circuit saying that "the [Probation] Act extends to
all defendants (with certain exceptions not here relevant) against
whom a judgment of conviction is entered."4 9
In Whitfield, the Ninth Circuit followed Wiley in at least one respect by disclaiming the notion that the defendant was denied probation
because she pleaded not guilty. The court also held that the defendant's
refusal to waive her right to appeal her conviction also played no part
in the district court's decision not to grant her application for probation. 0 But, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit went on to say that
"it is not an abuse of discretion for a district judge to deny probation to
a person who, after conviction, will not admit wrongdoing." 5' 1 This
standard seems to be equally as arbitrary and capricious as one that
never allows probation to a defendant who chooses to plead not guilty
and exercise his constitutional right to trial by jury. Since it does
not weigh the merits and does not consider any of the important criteria
suggested above,5 2 such a summary disposition of the application for
probation is surely an abuse of discretion that completely overlooks the
very purposes of a probation statute. Such a uniform standard applied
to all cases alike completely ignores one of probation's most widely acclaimed attributes, the individualization of sentences. Application of
this standard also overlooks the possibility that the defendant might in
fact be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.
A probation hearing is properly brought after the judgment of
conviction is rendered. If, at this time, the defendant was forced to
"admit guilt" or summarily be denied probation, what effect would this
decision have on the defendant's right to appeal from the judgment of
conviction? Although this was not the case in Whitfield53 and the
Ninth Circuit did not extend its "admit guilt or no probation" decision
this far, the detrimental effect of such an admission to a prospective
appeal is obvious.
If, as was said by the Supreme Court, "[p]robation is concerned
with rehabilitation, not with the determination of guilt. . . . [and the]
'sentences' obtained-in the corridors than in the courtroom." CoHEN, supra note 22,
at 17.
48. 267 F.2d at 456.
49. Id. (emphasis added). "Within the area defined by Congress, a district
judge is required to act upon applications for probation made by persons convicted
of crime (except those punishable by death or life imprisonment). However, he has
no authority to either expand or reduce that area." Id.
50. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
51. 401 F.2d at 483; see text accompany notes 9-11 supra.
52. See notes 30-31 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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considerations it involves are entirely apart from any reexamination of
the merits of the litigation,"5 4 why should the court allow a post-conviction admission of guilt to be the determinative factor in denying probation? In probation proceedings guilt has already been established and
a subsequent admission thereof serves no useful purpose. The reasoning behind the "admit guilt or no probation" standard seems to be
based upon the ecclesiastical notion that confession is good for the soul
and cleanses the conscience, that unless the defendant is penitent he
cannot be saved, i.e., he cannot be rehabilitated. Furthermore, if in
probation proceedings "[ilt is necessary to individualize each case, to
give that careful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender," 5 5 how do we reconcile this laudable
statement with a policy that summarily denies probation to anyone who
will not admit guilt after conviction? Clearly such a policy is repugnant
to the modem objective of penology to individualize each case and not
impose an identical sentence on all who are convicted of the same crime.
In 1960, the Circuit Conference of the Ninth Judicial Circuit
adopted a set of Policies and Standards for Sentencing.5 6 It is stated
therein that
[s]entences which are merely mathematically identical for violations of the same statute are improper, unfair and undesirable.
Indeed, mathematically identical sentences may be themselves disparate. Each defendant's case must be considered upon its highly
individualized basis and a sentence imposed which is tailored to fit
that case. Sentencing judges must in all instances consider all of
the factors in each case, giving appropriate weight to each factor,
and impose a sentence which is just to the defendant and just to
the community.
Equal justice in sentencing is achieved by an experienced, objective consideration by the sentencing judge of all of the individual
factors in each case weighed in relation to the sentences imposed
by other experienced and objective judges in cases which are similar in respect to the nature of the57violation of law and the background of the individual defendant.
These statements reflect an apparent commitment to one of the basic
tenets of our Constitution, equal justice under the law. In Whitfield,
a "mathematically identical" sentencing procedure was followed that
certainly was anything but an "objective consideration by the sentencing
judge of all of the individual factors." Thus, the Whitfield standard
seems to be an obvious denial of equal justice under the law. While
superficially at least it might appear that the imposition of identical
54.
55.
56.
57.

Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937).
Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
27 F.R.D. 293 (1961).
Id. at 390-91.
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sentences for all identical crimes fosters equal justice under the law,
such an outlook fails to recognize the extenuating or aggravating circumstances accompanying most, if not all, criminal convictions. And,
if justice is to be served at all, such circumstances must be considered
in probation and sentencing proceedings. Equal justice, then, is not
merely matching the punishment with the crime; it is the equalization
of punishment to match the crime and the circumstances surrounding
its commission.
Furthermore, the Probation Act applies to all defendants convicted
of offenses not punishable by death or life imprisonment. 58 While it is
true that no defendant has a right to be granted probation,59 all defendants so limited have a right to have the judge make a fair determination
on the merits in the exercise of his discretionary power. Again, as
stated in the Ninth Circuit's Policies and Standards for Sentencing:6"
A proper sentence is a composite of many factors, including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances-extenuating or aggravating--of the offense, the prior criminal record, if any, of the
offender, the age of the offender, the record of the offender as to
employment, the background of the offender with reference to
education, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental condition of the offender, the prospects for the
rehabilitation of the offender, the possibility of a return of the
offender to a normal life in the community, the possibility of treatment or of training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence
may serve as a deterrent to crime by this offender, or by others,
and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in
respect to the particular type of offense involved. 61
That probation should be left to the discretion of the trial judge
cannot be denied. He has the benefit both of his familiarity with the
case and of the presentence report prepared by the probation service.
With this information at his fingertips he is able to make a just determination, in light of all of the circumstances surrounding a specific defendant, whether or not to suspend the execution or imposition of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation. Such a determination,
however, should be on the merits of the application. It should be directed at promoting the basic principles sought to be achieved by the
Probation Act. 2 Any predetermined standard that automatically denies a defendant probation given a specific fact seems not only to be an
invidious denial of the defendant's right to a hearing on the merits of his
58.
59.
60.

See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1968).
27 F.R.D. 293 (1961).

61.

Id. at 390.

62. "[Tlhe grace and the discretion [of the trial judge] mean that the possibility
[of probation] shall be considered and that the consideration shall be made in accord

with the philosophy and purpose of the statute."
CORRECTION § 10, at 190 (1963).

S.

RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
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application 3 but is repugnant to the basic principles of the Probation
Act as well. Such a standard should not be sanctioned by the federal
appellate courts; rather, it should be struck down as an abuse of discretion. What decision could be more arbitrary and superficial than
one based upon the trial judge's policy never to grant probation if the
defendant has refused to admit guilt after his conviction?
In conclusion, the Whitfield standard, or any other standard that
summarily denies the defendant a fair hearing on the merits of his application for probation, is a denial of equal protection under the law,
violates the basic purposes of the Probation Act and reflects an adherence by the trial court to the now unpopular theory of penology, retribution, which overlooks the modem concepts of individualization of punishment and rehabilitation of the offender. Such a standard should not
go unquestioned by appellate review under the cloak of so nebulous a
concept as judicial discretion. Rather, the appellate courts should hasten to strike down any standard such as this under the auspices of their
supervisory powers of review, as an abuse of judicial discretion, or as a
denial of a substantive right to the defendant-the denial of equal protection of the law.
Floyd H. Shebley*
63. '"Where an individual is eligible for probation, the trial court must hear and
Failure to do so condetermine his application for probation on the merits....
stitutes a denial of a substantial right." People v. Hollis, 176 Cal. App. 2d 92, 98-99,
1 Cal. Rptr. 293, 297 (1959) (citations omitted).
* Member, Second Year Class.

